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HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MSS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT [1]

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LAST YEAR there was published in New York a Revised Standard Version of the New Testament. This version, in the words of the title-page, is "translated from the Greek being the version set forth in 1611, revised 1881 and 1901, and compared with the most ancient authorities and revised 1946." In effect this Revised Standard Version is a revision in the light of the Greek text of the English and American Revised Versions. It is not my business in this lecture to discuss the merits and demerits of this new Version as a *translation*. What I wish to point out, however, is that such a new version has been rendered necessary not only for linguistic but for textual reasons. The discovery of additional MSS and the very considerable achievements of textual critics since the publication of Hort's theory of the text in 1881, a theory which exercised considerable influence upon the framers of the English Revised Version, have, quite apart from any other considerations, made a fresh revision desirable.

The outstanding and permanent achievement of Hort was that he showed by a fuller scientific treatment of the evidence than had been previously attempted that the text underlying Erasmus' edition of the Greek Testament (an edition which had formed the basis of almost all subsequent editions prior to Hort,[2] and whose text became known to English readers in the Authorized Version) so far from being the primitive text of the New

[1] A lecture given to the Vacation Term of Biblical Study at Oxford, August, 1947.

[2] The only exceptions are Lachmann's two editions based on the oldest Greek MSS and the Vulgate; the first three editions of Tischendorf in which he followed Lachmann; and Tischendorf's editio (octava) major in which he followed Codex Sinaiticus. Tregelles, the immediate predecessor of Hort, also followed Lachmann.

Testament, was in fact the result of a revision, which had taken place in the fourth century, and which set the standard for the ecclesiastical text of the Byzantine empire, being reflected in the overwhelming majority of MSS from the fifth century onwards. It was in point of fact one of those later MSS, a twelfth century MS at Basle, known to critics by the figure 2, which formed the Greek basis for Erasmus' edition.

By a scientific grouping of the most ancient MSS that were known in his day and of such later MSS as were in general agreement with them; by an evaluation of one group against another in the light of their general characteristics and in accordance with certain assumed maxims of criticism (as for example that the longer reading is more likely to be the later, and that the more difficult reading is more likely to be primitive); and by a consideration in the light of patristic evidence of the locality and the date of the type of text which a particular group contained, — Hort concluded that the most primitive form of the text which we can discover was to be found in the agreement of the two most ancient MSS then known, viz. Codex Sinaiticus, then at St. Petersburg and now in the British Museum and known as ℵ, and the Codex Vaticanus in the Vatican Library known as B. The general agreement of the great Alexandrian scholar Origen and, as Hort thought, also of Clement with this text, and the further consideration that Alexandria was the place where there was most likely to have been the keenest desire to discover and preserve the true text, led Hort to the conclusion that this text was in fact the true text; so that the title page of the edition, published by Westcott and himself, which embodies this text, contains the words *The New Testament in the original Greek*. Hort called this text the *Neutral* text, on the ground that it was the text most free on the one hand from the numerous additions, paraphrases, and seemingly pointless changes which were characteristic of the second grouping of pre-Byzantine texts, which like Semler and Griesbach before him he called the *Western* text (because it was embodied mainly in the old Latin MSS, in the writings of the early Western Fathers, and in the famous fifth century Graeco-Latin MS at Cambridge known as Codex Bezae and referred to as D); and that it was the text most free on the other hand

from the stylistic changes of Alexandrian revisers, which were reflected in the fifth century MS at Paris, Codex Ephraemi, referred to as C, and the eighth century Paris MS Codex Regius, known as L.

It is now quite certain that Hort's text cannot with any veracity be called *The New Testament in the original Greek*. Rather does it represent a text known at Alexandria but not elsewhere (at any rate in many of its readings) not earlier than the middle of the third century. Consequently we cannot jump from the third century to the first without taking into greater account the widespread patristic evidence that comes to us from the second century, and the evidence of the old Latin and old Syriac versions, which bear testimony to underlying Greek texts current in that century.

Since 1881 there have been at least four discoveries of MSS of major importance, as a result of which it is increasingly impossible for the textual critic to remain entirely satisfied today with Hort's conclusions. First in 1892 Mrs. Lewis and Mrs. Gibson discovered in the monastery of St. Catherine on Mt. Sinai a MS of the old Syriac version of the Gospels, the underlying Greek text of which may well date from the second century. Secondly in 1906 Mr. Charles Freer purchased at Cairo a remarkable fifth century MS, now known as the Washington or Freer MS and referred to as W, the nature of whose text varies in different portions of the Gospels. Thirdly in 1913 a MS of the Gospels, which originally belonged to a monastery in the Caucasus known as Koridethi, was discovered and edited, and is now known as Codex Koridethi or θ. This MS contains traces of an early text though it has been heavily revised to conform to the Byzantine standard. Lastly, and in many respects the most important discovery of all, in 1931 an American, Mr. Chester Beatty, purchased several extensive papyrus fragments of the Gospels, Acts, and Pauline Epistles copied in the third century, i.e., a hundred years earlier than Codex Sinaiticus and Codex Vaticanus. The Chester Beatty Papyrus of the Gospels and Acts is known as p. 45; that of the Pauline Epistles as p. 46; and that of the Apocalypse as p. 47. In addition to these discoveries of MSS a large number of later cursive MSS have been collated since Hort's

day; and as a result of this work older families of such MSS, as were long known to be important by reason of the antiquity of their text have become enlarged. Thus fam.1, which originally consisted of four MSS,[3] has now been increased by at least two others; [4] and fam.13, or the Ferrar Group, which originally contained four members,[5] has now doubled its numbers.[6] In addition some of the old Latin MSS have been edited for the first time, notably Codex Bobiensis, known as k, whose text is as early as Cyprian.

In the light of these fresh discoveries and further studies it has become increasingly clear that Hort's grouping of the various pre-Byzantine texts needs considerable modification. His *Western* text has been seen to be more than purely Western in a geographical sense; and his *Neutral* text, so far from being primitive, has been shown to reveal the marks of a reviser. The mixed character of the texts revealed in recent discoveries has moreover made it clearer than before that all known texts are in reality mixed texts, though some to a greater extent than others; and that it is impossible to penetrate through the confusion that prevailed in the second century, owing to the undisciplined copying of MSS, to a pure unadulterated text. Thus the Sinaitic Syriac is found to have some important agreements with Hort's *Neutral* text, but also many agreements with the *Western* authorities, though it is evidence for a text which was in circulation in the East.[7] The Washington MS moreover bears testimony in Mark vi — end to a type of text which cannot be classified under any of Hort's groupings, but which can also be detected, in the Gospel of Mark at any rate, in the Koridethi MS, and in the cursives fam.1, fam.13, 28, 565, and 700, and in the Georgian version; and which is also reflected in the writings of Origen and of Eusebius of Caesarea.

It is impossible in the space of this lecture to trace the stages

[3] 1.118.131.209.

[4] 22. 1582.

[5] 13.69.124.346.

[6] By addition of 543.788.826.828.983.1689. (See Studies and Documents vol. xl. 1941. K. and S. Lake.)

[7] The Western element in the Sinaitic Syriac may however have come into it, as Burkitt maintained, through Tatian's Diatessaron, which if written when Tatian was in Rome would naturally have a Western text.

by which, thanks to the labors of such eminent textual critics as Nestle, von Soden, and Gregory in Germany; Burkitt, Kenyon, Souter, Streeter, and Turner in Great Britain; and Kirsopp Lake, Silva Lake, Ropes, Blake, and Sanders in America; (and many others), fresh groupings of the authorities giving a pre-Byzantine text have been rendered possible. I can only summarize the situation as it exists today by saying that it would now seem evident that at the close of the second century there were in existence four main types of text in the Gospels. (1) Western, in a geographical sense, represented by Codex Bezae and the old Latin versions and widely attested by second-century Fathers, and found to some extent also in Clement of Alexandria. (2) Alexandrian, represented by Codex Vaticanus, Codex Sinaiticus (when it agrees with Vaticanus); the cursives 33, 157, 892, and the Egyptian versions. (3) The text represented by the old Syriac versions which stands somewhat outside all other classifications, but which, when it is in agreement with the old Latin and with second-century Patristic evidence, is probably the oldest text not purely local that we can discover. (4) A Caesarean text, which is to be found in the writings of Origen and Eusebius; in the MSS θ, 565, 700 and the Georgian versions. The other members of the wider Caesarean group previously mentioned should now be distinguished (so Kirsopp Lake and Silva Lake have recently informed us),[8] at any rate as far as the Gospel of Mark is concerned from θ, 565, 700 and the Georgian version, because they are found to agree more with the Chester Beatty Papyrus (p. 45) than with the quotations from Origen and Eusebius; and p. 45, by reason of its date, gives a text older than Origen. Mrs. Lake would therefore regard p. 45, W, fam.1, and fam.13 as constituting a pre-Caesarean text. If this conclusion is correct (and we must await her forthcoming edition of The Caesarean Text of Mark for the detailed evidence) then we have more decisive reasons for supposing that the *Neutral* text of Hort is in the nature of a recension rather than a survival of a primitive text.

Mrs. Lake's conclusion is of special interest, because a similar result seems to have been reached by Dr. Zuntz in his study of

[8] Studies and Documents. (vol. xi. pp. 7.8.)

the Chester Beatty Papyrus in the Pauline Epistles which formed the subject of his Schweicht lectures delivered at the British Academy last autumn, the publication of which will be awaited with great interest. He has shown in these lectures from evidence taken from the Epistle to the Hebrews and I Corinthians that the Chester Beatty Papyrus of the Pauline Epistles, where it presents a distinctive text, is found in company with B, a late minuscule on Mt. Athos 1739, and the papyrus fragment p. 13; and that it gives a text which is neither specifically Neutral nor specifically Western, but a mixed text, similar to the Caesarean, and (we should now add) the pre-Caesarean, texts of the Gospel of Mark, and also reflected in the writing of Clement of Alexandria.[9]

In my own article in The Journal of Theological Studies (October 1937) entitled The Nature of the Text in the Chester Beatty Papyrus in Acts, I endeavored to show that the same kind of phenomenon is found also in Acts; and that in addition to the Western text represented by D, the old Latin, and the margin of the Harclean Syriac; and the old Uncial text represented by A.B.C.81; there can also be detected another text, similar in its characteristic of being a mixed text to the Caesarean text of the Gospels, and also found mainly in later cursive MSS, viz. 1739, 614, and 431.

It is now evident that no single one of these pre-Byzantine groupings is so infallible that its readings can always be followed in preference to those found in other groups. We can also see, more clearly perhaps than Hort was able to do, that widespread geographical attestation at an early date is a more certain (though again not an infallible) guide to the probability of a particular reading being original than strong attestation from one particular locality, even though that locality be Alexandria.[10] It is moreover realized today that the old canons of criticism, such as those sug-

[9] B disagrees with ℵ more frequently in the Pauline Epistles than in the Gospels; and Hort did not follow B in such disagreements to the same extent as he did in the Gospels. The suggestion that 1739 was probably evidence for a type of text similar to the Caesarean text of the Gospels was first put forward by K. Lake in Six Collations of New Testament Manuscripts (Harvard 1932) where a collation of the MS is given.

[10] Burkitt e.g. maintained that the agreement of B. k. and the old Syriac should usually be regarded as decisive.

gesting that the more difficult or the shorter reading is likely to be the more original, though often true in particular cases, must be used with great caution; for many of the scribes who copied the MSS or took the text down from dictation were ignorant men, who were just as capable of creating difficulties as of removing them; and who, like all copyists, were prone to leave out through carelessness words and even whole lines, as well as freely to paraphrase the text in the interests of greater lucidity. Above all we realize today that in the evaluation of the text of one group of MSS against that of another the last word in individual readings must often rest with internal evidence, and in particular with such considerations as the style and outlook of the author concerned and the context in which the specific variant is found. "All intelligent textual criticism," as Vaganay has rightly said, "is ultimately subjective."

In the light of the changed outlook in the textual-critical horizon it may be of interest to notice some of the changes now considered necessary in Hort's text and in the English Revised Version, where that Version follows it. But first let it be said that subsequent study has done much to substantiate the major changes which Hort proposed; as e.g. the omission of the long ending of Mark (xvi.9–20); the omission of the famous pericope about the woman taken in adultery from the text of the Gospel of John; the omission of the word ἐν Ἐφέσῳ in the first verse of the Epistle to the Ephesians (an omission found also in p. 46); the rejection of the words "without a cause" in the saying on anger in Matthew v.22; and the preference in Mark vi.14 for the reading ἔλεγον, found in B,D,W, and the old Latin and translated in the Revised Standard Version, to ἔλεγεν. The sense demanded in the last passage is that "men generally were saying that John had risen from the dead"; and it is with this opinion that Herod expresses his personal agreement in verse 16. It is also I think clear that most of the notable passages omitted in the Western text with or without other support in the last chapters of Luke, passages styled by Hort "Western non-interpolations" [11] and placed by him in double square brackets; passages whose omission was noted in the margin of the English

[11] Some of them may just as well be called "Neutral Interpolations."

Revised Version, ought now to be taken from the text and relegated to the margin, as they have been in some instances in the American Revised Standard Version. Internal as well as external evidence is almost decisive against supposing that such passages as the longer account of the institution of the Eucharist,[12] the bloody sweat and the angel of the agony,[13] the first word from the cross,[14] the running of Peter to the empty tomb and his notice of the grave-clothes,[15] and the ascension of Jesus into heaven,[16] were part of the original text of the Gospel of Luke.

On the other hand there are several passages where I would say (limiting my selections to passages in the Gospels) that the makers of the American Revised Standard Version are also right in not following Hort's text. Let me enumerate a few of them. In John i.18 in spite of the strong array of Alexandrian authorities ℵ B,C,L for the reading *μονογονὴς θεὸς*, that expression is so unintelligible that we should almost certainly adopt the reading *μονογονὴς υἱὸς* found in A,*θ*, fam.1 and the mass of late MSS. Codex Bezae is deficient at this point; and Codex Regius has a conflate reading *ὁ μονογονὴς υἱὸς θεός*.

In Mark i.1 we should accept as genuine the reading *Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ* found in the mass of MSS rather than the reading *Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, which Hort accepted on very slender MSS evidence (actually only ℵ 28. and, we can now add *θ*) because the addition was of a doctrinal nature and therefore suspect, and the variant seemed to be a case calling for the application of the maxim "brevior lectio probabilior." The evangelist in point of fact begins his Gospel with the doctrinal statement "Jesus Christ the Son of God"; and, as he brings his narrative of the earthly life to a close, a similar confession of faith is uttered by the centurion at the foot of the cross. The omission in i.1 is therefore accidental.

In Luke x.42 the words which Jesus spoke to Martha were almost certainly *ἑνὸς δέ ἐστιν χρεία* as in p. 45, A.C.W., *θ*, 28, fam.1 (except 1.), fam.13, and not the more difficult but unintelligible *ὀλίγων δέ ἐστιν χρεία ἢ ἑνός*, which was preferred by

[12] xxii. 19b–20.
[13] xxii. 43–44.
[14] xxiii. 34.
[15] xxiv. 12.
[16] xxiv. 51.

Hort, in spite of the fact that it is a conflate reading, in accordance with the maxim "difficilior lectio potior," on the evidence of the Alexandrian authorities ℵ,B,L,33. The balance of the passage, not to mention the deeper spiritual significance of the saying, demands that "one" thing should be set in contrast to the "many" things with which Martha was cumbered.

In Luke xiv.5 in spite of the support of p. 45, A,B,N,W., θ, 28 for the reading *υἱὸς ἢ βοῦς* favored by Hort, I believe the Revised Standard Version is again right in preferring the simple and more intelligible reading *ὄνος ἢ βοῦς* with ℵ,L.fam.1,fam.13. and the textus receptus; though it is possible that both *υἱὸς* and *ὄνος* are alterations of a more primitive text now lost.

In Luke xvi.12 the sense of the passage demands the reading *ὑμέτερον* with the great majority of MSS rather than *ἡμέτερον* favored by Hort and found only in B.L. 1574 and Origen. "If you have not proved faithful in that which is another's, who will give you that which is your own?" It must however be admitted that both readings are very difficult to interpret.

In John vii.8 in the passage about going up to the Feast the American Revisers have translated the more difficult reading *οὐ* found in a few old uncials ℵ,D,K,M,Π and in the old Syriac versions, rejecting the easier and more widely attested reading *οὔπω* preferred by Hort and the Revised Version. It would seem clear that this latter reading was introduced at an early date to obviate the apparent inconsistency between verses 8 and 13. According to the reading *οὐ* Jesus after having said that he would not go up to the Feast of Tabernacles later did go up. Because of the extreme improbability of supposing in view of the narrative as a whole that any scribe would alter *οὔπω* to *οὐ* except by sheer accident, it is best to retain the difficult reading and to explain the passage by emphasizing the fact, to which the evangelist draws attention, that it was only in *secret* and not as an open manifestation to the crowds that Jesus could go up to Jerusalem at the present Feast of Tabernacles. The time for His real ascent in triumph and for an open manifestation had not yet come; and it would not be "at this feast" (i.e. of Tabernacles) but at the Passover Festival that that ascent in triumph would be made.

In all these passages, deciding in every case against Hort,

and sometimes against the Revised Version as well, the American Revisers seem to me to have made the right decision, and to have acted, as all intelligent textual critics should act, not by any rule of thumb or any mechanical theory of the text, but by the exercise of rational criticism.

Other noticeable readings which have come to light, or evidence for which has been strengthened since the days of Hort and the Revised Version, but the originality of which is still in debate, are rightly placed by the American Revisers in the margin. Examples of such readings are the interesting Jesus Barabbas reading in Matthew xxvii.16.17, which has the attestation of θ fam.1. the Sinaitic Syriac and the Georgian version and Origen (who notes that he found it in very ancient MSS): and the omission of the words "and the life" in John xi.25 from the sentence "I am the Resurrection and the Life," an omission which is supported by the remarkable geographical combination of p. 45 the Sinaitic Syriac and Cyprian. It is the first time that either of these variants appear on the pages of a standardized English version.

In this necessarily brief and inadequate summary of the present attitude of textual critics towards the MSS of the Greek Testament as they are known today, I have naturally concentrated your attention upon the MSS whose text is of a pre-Byzantine character. My summary would however be incomplete, if I did not add in conclusion that during the years that have passed since Hort's edition, attention has also been given to the Byzantine text itself; and in this field, as in others, it has been shown that that text is far more mixed and contains more varied strata than had hitherto been supposed. Just as some of the authorities once classified in a bunch under the title "Western" are now seen to contain other types of text as well, so some of the numerous MSS, which were once jumbled together on the ground that they gave a text which was roughly the text which Hort called "Syrian," and which later scholars have called the "Ecclesiastical" or "Byzantine" text, have now been found to be of a more mixed type. The German scholar von Soden was the first to subdivide these MSS: and working upon his classifications, and at one important point correcting and improving them,

Silva Lake, in the remarkable piece of research which forms volume v of Studies and Documents published in 1937 under the title Family II and the Codex Alexandrinus, has shown that the ninth century Codex Cyprius in Paris known as K and the ninth century Codex Petropolitanus of the Gospels in Leningrad known as π, together with a number of minuscules, constitute in fact a family, called by Mrs. Lake fam.π, which testifies to an early, probably the earliest, form of the Byzantine text, and which has as an ancestor in the Gospel of Mark at any rate a representative of the pre-Caesarean text found in p. 45,W, fam.1 and fam.13. In that study Mrs. Lake has also shown that the famous Codex Alexandrinus in the British Museum (known as A), which von Soden had wrongly classified with K, while it is descended directly from an ancestor of π, has also been considerably revised in the light of the Alexandrian text represented in C,L33. Both fam.π and A are therefore of special interest by reason of the fact that their text occupies a kind of halfway house between the pre-Byzantine texts and the secondary stage of the Byzantine text represented by S.V. Ω., which later developed into the fully established ecclesiastical text found in the uncials EFGHM, most minuscules, and most frequently copied in the middle ages.

To sum up: — No single MS and no one group of MSS exists, which should be mechanically followed in our effort to probe towards the original text of the New Testament in passages where differences exist. All known texts are to a greater or less extent mixed texts; and even the earliest of them are not free from errors. When therefore we seek to grope our way through the confusion of the second century evidence in the hope of coming closer to the original text, we are bound to consider not only the antiquity and the geographical nature of the MSS evidence, but also to bring into play all the philological and exegetical scholarship of which we are capable: and even then our critical judgments will in no sense be final or certain judgments, but only tentative conclusions, which at best have rational arguments in their support.

ORIGEN, CELSUS, AND THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY

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There were indeed many respects in which Christianity was objectionable to Celsus. But perhaps no doctrine was so peculiarly nauseating to him as the Jewish-Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body. At the beginning of the fifth book of the contra Celsum Origen is dealing with Celsus' attacks on the pride shown by the Jews in supposing that they were the chosen people of God. Celsus is contending that the Jewish belief in angels is merely a manifestation of this (5.6). They believe they have a particularly privileged position in God's sight on the ground of the angelic messengers sent to them by God (cf. 5.41), and this fantastic conceit is equally manifested in their self-centered conception of the resurrection which is nothing more than the outcome of their delusion that they are the center of the universe and that the world was made entirely for their benefit (4.74–99).[1] It is in this context that he continues:

> It is foolish also of them to suppose that, when God applies the fire (like a cook!), all the rest of mankind will be thoroughly burnt up, and that they alone will survive, not merely those who are alive at the time, but also those long dead who will rise up from the earth possessing the same bodies as before. This is simply the hope of worms. For what sort of human soul would have any further desire for a body that has rotted? The fact that this doctrine is not shared by some of you (Jews) and by some Christians shows its utter repulsiveness, and

[1] On the connection of thought in the original text of Celsus see a good discussion by A. Wifstrand in Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundets i Lund Årsberattelse 1941–2, at pp. 409–10. And for the Jewish-Christian belief that the people of God are the ultimate purpose of the creation and that the world is maintained for them, cf. M. Dibelius on Hermas, Vis. 1.16, in the Ergänzungsband to Lietzmann's Handbuch zum N.T., 1923.

My debt should here be expressed to Dr. W. Telfer who kindly read this article in its first draft, and made a number of valuable criticisms of detail and helped to remove some ambiguities.

that it is both revolting and impossible. For what sort of body, after being entirely corrupted, could return to its original nature and that same first condition which it had before it was dissolved? As they have nothing to say in reply, they escape to a most outrageous refuge by saying that "anything is possible with God." But, indeed, neither can God do what is shameful nor does he desire what is contrary to nature. If you were to desire something abominable in your wickedness, not even God would be able to do this, and you ought not to believe at all that your desire will be fulfilled. For God is not the author of sinful desire, or of disorderly confusion, but of what is naturally just and right. For the soul he might be able to provide an everlasting life; but as Heraclitus says, "corpses ought to be thrown away even more than dung."[2] As for the flesh, which is full of things which it is not even nice to mention, God would neither desire nor be able to make it everlasting contrary to reason. For he himself is the reason of everything that exists; therefore he is not able to do anything contrary to reason or to his own character. (5.14).

The justification of belief in the resurrection of the body on grounds of divine omnipotence is denied by Origen when he comes to deal with this particular point (5.23); we are well aware, he says, that divine omnipotence does not mean that God can do anything in the sense that it is possible for him to do anything incompatible with his divine nature. However, as so frequently in the contra Celsum, the evidence of other Christian literature supports Celsus against Origen since there is plenty of evidence that other Christian apologists did use this argument. It is precisely the appeal to divine omnipotence which is made in defence of the resurrection of the body by Clement of Rome (27.2), Justin Martyr (Apol. 1.19), Athenagoras (de Resurr. Mort. 9), Irenaeus (adv. Haer. 5.3.2–3), Tertullian (de Carnis Resurr. 57), and by the Apocalypse of Peter (Ethiopic text).[3] Furthermore, it is interesting to notice that when Origen himself is not engaged in defending Christian doctrine from external attack, but is criticizing the popular conception of the resurrection as held within the church, he expresses his criticism in terms very close to those used by Celsus.

[2] Heraclitus Frag. B 86 Diels.

[3] Conveniently translated in M. R. James, The Apocryphal New Testament (Oxford, 1924) p. 512.

Origen's opinions on this subject were no doubt expounded his early work on the Resurrection in two books (Eus. H. E. 24.2), now lost.[4] His doctrine can, however, be recovered from various sources — from his reply to the attack of Celsus which we have quoted, from the important work of Methodius which was primarily intended as a direct attack on Origen's attempt to "spiritualize" the traditional doctrine, and from Jerome (especially Epist. 124.10, and contra Joh. Hier. 25–26). The interest of Epiphanius in the pernicious doctrine of the Alexandrine fortunately led him to make a considerable quotation from Methodius and he has so preserved for us in Greek a substantial section of Origen's commentary on the first psalm, where in interpreting verse 5 ("Therefore the wicked shall not rise up in the judgement, nor sinners in the council of the righteous") he appends an extended discussion of his understanding of the matter.[5] And it is here that he complains that when the *simpliciores* are questioned and difficulties are raised "they take refuge in the assertion, All things are possible to God." (*καὶ μετὰ ταύτας τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπὶ τὸ πάντα εἶναι δυνατὰ τῷ θεῷ καταφεύγουσι.*)[6]

It is evident that Celsus and Origen start from the same presuppositions in their approach to the problem; they are agreed that it is quite mistaken to appeal to divine omnipotence in order to justify belief in what seems fantastic. For all this the background is to be found in the debate between the Academy and the Stoa, going back to the time of Carneades in the second century B.C. The theory and practice of divination was accepted by the Stoics as being a necessary corollary of their doctrine of provi-

[4] For a catalogue of the surviving fragments cf. A. v. Harnack, Geschichte der altchristlichen Litteratur I 1, p. 384. They are printed in Lommatzsch xvii. 53–64. Origen wrote two books and two dialogues on the resurrection, which were thus reckoned as four books; cf. Rufinus, adv. Hieron. 2.20; Jerome, c. Joh. Hier. 25. It is perhaps worth noting that Preuschen (in Harnack p. 383) gives the wrong reference to Rufinus, and omits the all-important word *quarto* in his quotation from Jerome (p. 384).

[5] Methodius, de Resurr.1.20–24 = Epiphanius, Panar. 64.12 ff. = Origen, Sel. in Ps. xi.384 ff. ed. Lommatzsch.

[6] Celsus' words are *οὐδὲν ἔχοντες ἀποκρίνασθαι καταφεύγουσιν εἰς ἀποπωτάτην ἀναχώρησιν, ὅτι πᾶν δυνατὸν τῷ θεῷ.* (5.14, II p.15.12 ed.Koetschau). Similarly in c.Cels.2.77 and 3.70.

For a Zoroastrian answer to the question cf. H. W. Bailey, Zoroastrian Problems in the Ninth-Century Books (Oxford, 1943) p. 93–94.

dence, and this involved them in an attempt to defend some of the more prodigious miracle-stories related about omens and signs. In Cicero, de Divinatione 2.41.86 we learn from the Academic criticism that the Stoics used to appeal to divine omnipotence, very much in the same way as the *simpliciores* of Origen, as a justification of their belief in these remarkable narratives. "Nihil est, inquiunt, quod deus efficere non possit. Utinam sapientis Stoicos effecisset ne omnia cum superstitiosa sollicitudine et miseria crederent!" Similarly in de Natura Deorum 3.39.92: "Vos enim ipsi dicere soletis nihil esse quod deus efficere non possit, et quidem sine labore ullo; ut enim hominum membra nulla contentione mente ipsa ac voluntate moveantur, sic numine deorum omnia fingi moveri mutarique posse."

I hope to show in the course of this article that this is not the only respect in which Origen's discussion of the resurrection has been influenced by the old debates of the Academy and the philosophical schools. But it is necessary first to examine Origen's criticism of the popular conception as held in the church.

II

Origen begins from the basic fact that the nature of σῶμα is impermanent; it is in a continual state of change and transformation, caused by the food which is eaten, absorbed by the body, and turned into tissue. This is the point developed by Aglaophon, whom Methodius makes the mouthpiece of Origen's opinions in his dialogue. Matter, he says, is continually in a state of flux and subject to change, like the stream of a river rising and falling, so that it never remains the same even for a short time. When we say the body will rise again, what body do we mean? That of a youth, or of an old man, or of a child? The body is always being changed by the food eaten. And the flesh of a newborn child, or a youth, and of an old man, are different; we change from the flesh we have at first to another flesh, that of a child or a youth, and from this into that of an old man, changing our clothes, as it were, when they are worn out. For though hard and indigestible food is passed out of the stomach, the easily digestible food is formed into flesh, because it is absorbed by the contiguous veins which carry the blood. (Methodius 1.9). Paul

refers to this continual transformation of the body when he says in II Cor. 4.16: "Though our outward man perish, our inward man is renewed day by day" (Methodius 1.12).[7]

There can be no doubt that the words which Methodius has here put into the mouth of Aglaophon represent very closely Origen's own statement. The whole passage, for example, is an admirable commentary on a parenthetic sentence in Origen's de Oratione 27.8 (where he is not discussing the resurrection at all, but the Platonic and Stoic definitions of *ousia*): *τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον σωμάτων, περὶ ἃ γίνεται ἡ αὔξη καὶ ἡ φθίσις παρὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὰ ῥευστά, δεόμενα τοῦ ὑποστηρίζοντος ἐπεισιόντος καὶ τρέφοντος· ὅπερ ἐὰν πλεῖον ἐν καιρῷ ἐπεισίῃ τοῦ ἀπορῥέοντος, αὔξησις γίνεται, ἐὰν δὲ ἔλαττον, μείωσις· τάχα δέ τινα οὐδ' ὅλως τὸ ἐπεισιὸν λαμβάνοντα ἐν ἀκράτῳ, ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, μειώσει γίνεται.* The nature of bodies as being *ῥευστά* is a commonplace, e.g. de Orat. 6.1: *κἂν φθίνῃ δὲ καθ' αὑτά,*[8] *τῷ ῥευστὰ εἶναι πάντα τὰ σώματα φθίνοντα παρακολουθητικὴν ἔχει τὴν ἐν τῷ φθίνειν κίνησιν.* Proclus, the other mouthpiece of Origen in Methodius, says: *ῥευστοῦ γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ὑλικοῦ καὶ μηδέποτε μένοντος ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ κἂν τὸ βραχύ, ἀλλὰ προσγινομένου καὶ ἀπογινομένου περὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ χαρακτηρίζον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὑφ' οὗ καὶ συγκρατεῖται τὸ σχῆμα, κτλ.* (1.25.3). And naturally the same idea recurs when Methodius replies, as in 2.13.8 (Slavonic only), and 1.47.1: *ἀπὸ τῶν προσιόντων γάρ, φησίν, αὔξεται* (sc. *τὸ γεννώμενον*) *καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπιόντων ἐλαττοῦται.* The terminology here is simply drawn from that of popular philosophy;[9] compare Plotinus 2.1.3; 4.7.8; Philo, de Post. Caini 163; Albinus Epit. 1.2;[10] Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 2.118.5, and 3.86.4; Diels, Doxogr. Gr. p. 307a.24, p. 572.25. The idea is taken up by Gregory Nazianzen (Orat.

[7] The passage is only extant in the old Slavonic version, translated into German in Bonwetsch's edition of Methodius (Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller Band 27, Leipzig, 1917). My paraphrase above depends on Bonwetsch.

[8] The text is so emended by H. von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Fragm. II, p. 288. The Trinity manuscript has *κἂν κινῆτε καὶ ταῦτα.* (Arnim gives *αὐτά* in his apparatus, but this is wrong; the MS. reading is quite clear).

[9] An excellent commentary on the ideas here is to be found in Lucretius 2.1105–44. Perhaps ultimately it goes back to Plato, Timaeus 42A: *ὁπότε δὴ σώμασιν ἐμφυτευθεῖεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ τὸ μὲν προσίοι, τὸ δ' ἀπίοι τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν, κτλ.*

[10] A critical edition of Albinus has been produced by P. Louis (Paris, 1945), superseding that of Hermann in his Teubner edition of Plato, vol. VI, Berlin, 1895.

31.15), and Gregory of Nyssa (de Anima et Resurr. Migne, P. G. XLVI. 149 f.).[11]

Origen's second line of attack is the contention that at death the body returns into its constituent elements, and although the composing elements do not in any sense cease to exist, yet they cannot be put together again in their original form. To paraphrase the words which Methodius puts into the mouth of Proclus (1.14–15), the body is composed of the four elements, fire, earth, air, and water; and from each of these God took what was required in order to make up the body. When the body dies, it dissolves again into these elements — the watery part again becomes water, the dry part earth, the warm part fire, and the cold part air. This can be illustrated from the natural order. If you take wine or milk or blood, or any liquid which will mix with water, and you pour a certain quantity into the sea; the wine and milk which you have thrown in are not lost in the sense that they have ceased to exist, but it is impossible to recover the quantity thrown into the sea in the separate state. Similarly the actual matter composing human flesh and blood does not stop existing at death, but it cannot again be restored to its former state.

Here again that Methodius is closely following Origen's own words is clear from the verbal parallels in Jerome, adv. Joh. Hier. ad Pamm. 25 (M.P.L. XXIII. 376 BC):

Quatuor, inquit, elementa sunt, philosophis quoque nota et medicis, de quibus omnes res et corpora humana compacta sunt, terra, aqua, aer, et ignis. Terram in carnibus, aerem in halitu, aquam in humore, ignem in calore intelligi. cum ergo anima caducum hoc frigidumque corpusculum dei iussione dimiserit, paulatim omnia redire ad matrices suas substantias: carnes in terram relabi, halitum in aera misceri, humorem reverti ad abyssos, calorem ad aethera subvolare. et quomodo si sextarium lactis et vini mittas in pelagus, velisque rursum separare quod mixtum est: vinum quidem et lac quod miseras non perire, non tamen posse quod fusum est separari: sic substantiam carnis et sanguinis non perire quidem in originalibus materiis, non tamen in antiquam redire compaginem, nec posse ex toto eadem esse quae fuerint.

[11] Quotations from the relevant passages are cited by Bonwetsch.

Thirdly, Origen scores a palpable hit when he asks what will happen to the bodies of people eaten by wild beasts, since, just as the food we eat is absorbed by the veins and becomes part of the constitution of our body, so also men's bodies devoured by animals become part of them:

Just as the food which we eat is assimilated into our body and changes its characteristics, so also our bodies are transformed in carnivorous birds and beasts and become parts of their bodies; and again, when their bodies are eaten by men or by other animals, they are changed back again and become the bodies of men or of other animals (Origen ap. Methodius 1.20.4: *ὥσπερ εἰς τὸ ἡμέτερον σῶμα αἱ τροφαὶ κατατάττονται καὶ μεταβάλλουσι τὰς ὁμοιότητας, οὕτως καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα μεταβάλλονται ἐν τοῖς σαρκοβόροις οἰωνοῖς καὶ θηρίοις καὶ γίγνεται μέρη τῶν ἐκείνων σωμάτων, καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖνα ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἑτέρων ζῴων ἐσθιόμενα ἀντιμεταβάλλεται καὶ γίγνεται ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἑτέρων ζῴων σώματα.*).

The situation envisaged by Origen is undoubtedly a cogent argument for his view; it was the point which caused most difficulty to Augustine (de Civ. Dei 22.20), and it was urged by pagans against the traditional doctrine in the time of Tertullian (de Carnis Resurrectione 4, p. 30 ed. Kroymann), Athenagoras (de Resurrectione Mortuorum 4), and Tatian (Oratio ad Gr. 6). Celsus nowhere raises this difficulty. But Porphyry certainly did so (ap. Macarius Magnes 4.24, T.U. XXXVII.4, Leipzig, 1911, p. 92): [12]

For often many have perished in the sea and their bodies have been consumed by fishes; many have been eaten by beasts and birds. How then can their bodies come back again? Let us briefly examine what we have said. For instance, suppose someone has been shipwrecked, and his body is eaten by mullets; they in turn were caught by some fishermen, who, after eating the fish, were killed and eaten by dogs; and when the dogs died they were completely consumed by crows and vultures. How then will the body of the man who suffered shipwreck be reassembled again after it has been eaten up by so many animals? And again, another has been consumed by fire, and another eaten by worms; how can such return into the existence which they had at first?

[12] Porphyry, Frag. 94 ed. Harnack, in Abhandlungen der königl. preuss. Akad. d. Wissenschaften, philos. hist. Kl., 1916. It is not improbable that Augustine has Porphyry's objections in mind when he defends the resurrection of the flesh in the last book of the De Civitate Dei.

But you will tell me that this is possible for God. That is not true. For not all things are possible. . . .

The rest of Porphyry's criticism follows the line taken by Celsus, which we have discussed above: God is not omnipotent in the sense that he can do what is contrary to his own nature or what is intrinsically impossible; he cannot bring it about that Homer was not a poet, or that twice two, which (as Porphyry kindly notes) make four, should make five.

Origen's fourth objection is that if the flesh is to rise again in the same form, then what use is going to be found for its organs? Are we seriously to suppose, he asks, that the wicked are going to be provided with teeth to gnash with? (ap. Method. 1.24). If the simple view of the resurrection is accepted, then risen bodies will have the same needs as earthly bodies; we shall need to eat and drink in the heavenly places (ibid. 1.7); some use will have to be found for our hands and feet (3.7.6–7).

Once again Methodius' account of Origen's teaching is supported by Jerome (adv. Joh. Hier. 25, M.P.L. XXIII. 375):

Dicit ergo Origenes . . . duplicem errorem versari in ecclesia, nostrorum et haereticorum: nos simplices et philosarcas dicere, quod eadem ossa, et sanguis, et caro, id est, vultus et membra, totiusque compago corporis resurgatt in novissima die: scilicet ut pedibus ambulemus, operemur manibus, videamus oculis, auribus audiamus, circumferamusque ventrem insatiabilem, et stomachum cibos concoquentem. Consequens autem esse, qui ista credamus, dicere nos quod et comedendum nobis sit, et bibendum, digerenda stercora, effundendus humor, ducendae uxores, liberi procreandi. quo enim membra genitalia si nuptiae non erunt? quo dentes si cibi non molendi sunt? quo venter et cibi si iuxta apostolum et hic et illi destruentur? ipso iterum clamante: Caro et sanguis regnum dei non possidebunt, neque corruptio incorruptionem. haec nos innocentes et rusticos asserit dicere. Haereticos vero, in quorum parte sunt Marcion, Apelles, Valentinus, Manes, nomen insaniae, penitus et carnis et corporis resurrectionem negare: et salutem tantum tribuere animae, frustraque nos dicere ad exemplum domini resurrecturos, cum ipse quoque dominus in phantasmate resurrexerit. . . .

Similarly ibid. 26 (378 B): Alioqui si eaedem carnes erunt, et corpora quae fuerunt, rursum mares et feminae, rursum nuptiae; viris hirsutum supercilium, barba prolixa; mulieribus laeves genae, et an-

gusta pectora, ad concipiendos et pariendos fetus venter et femora dilatanda sunt. resurgent etiam infantuli, resurgent et senes; illi nutriendi, hi baculis sustentandi.

In this argument that if the body is to rise again some use must be found for its organs, once again we have a pagan difficulty: Tertullian is aware that this objection is being raised in his time (de Carnis Res. 4, and especially 60):

Quo enim iam, inquiunt, spelunca haec oris et dentium statio et gulae lapsus et competum stomachi et alvei gurges et intestinorum perplexa proceritas, cum esui et potui locus non erit? quo huiusmodi membra admittunt subigunt devolvunt dividunt digerunt egerunt? quo manus ipsae et pedes et operarii quique artus, cum victus etiam cura cessabit? quo renes, conscii seminum, et reliqua genitalium utriusque sexus et conceptuum stabula et uberum fontes, discessuro concubitu et fetu et educatu? postremo quo totum corpus, totum scilicet vacaturum?

If the fragments on the resurrection ascribed to Justin in the Sacra Parallela are genuine, then the difficulty to thought presented by the notion of the survival of sexual differentiation into the life of the world to come was already being felt in the middle of the second century.[13]

III

What is particularly interesting about this line of thought is the fact that it had a history in the debates of the philosophical schools in the second century B.C. Although the Epicurean denial that the gods have any interest in the world led to that philosophy being regarded as atheistic, it is recognized that in fact Epicurus not only believed in the existence of the gods but formulated a precise theory of their mode of existence.[14] In the first place, the existence of the gods is certain (a) because there is a universal belief that they do exist; (b) because in dreams men have visions of the gods. From the latter in particular we learn that the gods have a definite shape, since men see them having a human form. According to the scholiast on

[13] Karl Holl in Texte und Unters. XX, N.F. V, 2 (1899), pp. 38–39.

[14] In what follows I am mainly indebted to the masterly chapter in Cyril Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (Oxford, 1928) pp. 438–81. Cf. also A.-J. Festugière, Épicure et ses Dieux (Paris, 1946).

Diogenes Laertius 10.139 (Usener, Epicurea frag. 355) Epicurus definitely conceived of the gods as having human form, and the same assertion is made by Aetius (Diels, Doxogr. Gr. p. 306). Velleius in Cicero, de Natura Deorum 1.18.46–7, similarly argues:

Nam a natura habemus omnes omnium gentium speciem nullam aliam nisi humanam deorum. quae enim forma alia occurrit umquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormienti? sed, ne omnia revocentur ad primas notiones, ratio hoc idem ipsa declarat. Nam quum praestantissimam naturam, vel quia beata est vel quia sempiterna, convenire videatur eamdem esse pulcherrimam, quae compositio membrorum, quae conformatio lineamentorum, quae figura, quae species humana potest esse pulchrior?

Velleius continues with the rather cryptic statement that though the gods have a human shape, nevertheless their *species* is not body but *quasi corpus*, and it has not got blood, but *quasi sanguinem* (49). Apparently Epicurus thought of the gods as having a form (*quasi corpus*) possessing permanence derived from the continual stream of atoms arriving externally, so that the form remains constant while the matter is continually changing.

The gods are located in the *intermundia*, the spaces between the worlds, where they dwell in peace:

> Apparet divum numen sedesque quietae
> quas neque concutiunt venti nec nubila nimbis
> aspergunt neque nix acri concreta pruina
> cana cadens violat semperque innubilus aether
> integit, et large diffuso lumine ridet.
>
> (Lucretius 3.18–22).

Here they are safe from the destruction to which they would occasionally be liable if they were more closely involved in the world (Seneca, de Benef. 4.4.19; Cicero, de Divin. 2.17.40).[15]

[15] In c.Cels.4.14 Origen has one sentence about the Epicurean gods which was overlooked by Usener and has not, as far as I know, been considered by students of Epicurus: *οἱ δὲ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου θεοί, σύνθετοι ἐξ ἀτόμων τυγχάνοντες καὶ τὸ ὅσον ἐπι τῇ συστάσει ἀναλυτοί, πραγματεύονται τὰς φθοροποιοὺς ἀτόμους ἀποσείεσθαι.* Dr. Cyril Bailey, in a private letter, compares with this the scholiast's comment on the first of the Κύριαι Δόξαι (Diog. Laert. 10.139) according to whom Epicurus thought the gods are formed *ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιρρύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεσμένων ἀνθρωποειδῶς.* The gods have to be composed of the right sort of atoms, and are therefore "at pains to reject the destructive atoms" for the

Since the gods are conceived of as having human form, the question inevitably came to be raised as to how far their mode of existence corresponds to that of mankind. Unfortunately utterances of Epicurus himself on this subject have not been preserved to us. But the papyrus rolls discovered in the excavations at Herculaneum in 1752 contain fragments of the work On the Gods by Philodemus, the Epicurean of the first century B.C. The fragments of this work were edited by Walter Scott in his Fragmenta Herculanensia (Oxford, 1885), pp. 93–251, and again by Hermann Diels in Abhandlungen der königl. preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften phil. hist. Kl. 1915 Heft 7, and 1916 Heft 4 and 6. And here we find a rather startling development. According to Philodemus it might perhaps be a debatable point whether the gods use furniture or not (Scott, p. 167, and note p. 198; Diels, 1916, Heft 4, p. 33), but they certainly need *τροφή*. To them sleep is not necessary for the digestion of food, and in any case bears too great a resemblance to death, but apparently they do have *ἡσυχίαν ἀναλογοῦσαν* (Scott, p. 173, and note p. 199; Diels, p. 36). They breathe and converse with one another, and indeed carry on their conversations in Greek or some very similar language: *καὶ νὴ Διά γε τὴν Ἑλληνίδα νομιστέον ἔχειν αὐτοὺς διάλεκτον ἢ μὴ πόρρω* (Scott, p. 176; Diels, p. 37). It appears that there is even sexual differentiation.[16]

Naturally enough, this Epicurean doctrine was an obvious target for criticism. Sextus Empiricus (adv. Math. 9.178–9) objects that if God has the power of speech, he must also have lungs and windpipe, tongue and mouth — "but this is absurd and approaches the fantastic notions of Epicurus." And even if God does talk, *τί μᾶλλον τῇ Ἑλληνίδι ἢ τῷ βαρβάρῳ χρῆται γλώσσῃ*; Cotta, the Academic in Cicero, de Natura Deorum (1.33.92) replies to Velleius:

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reason that they are compounded, and like all other compounds may be dissolved by the intrusion of alien atoms causing disruption.

[16] So Scott p. 189, on the basis of Cicero, de Nat. Deor. 1.34.94–5; Philodemus, de Pietate p. 79 ed. Gomperz (conveniently in Diels, Doxogr. Gr. p. 546).

Dionysius of Halicarnassus has an amusing polemic against some who say that, if the gods use a language like ours, Zeus will use Plato's style; de Demosthene 23 (I owe this reference to the kindness of Professor A. D. Nock). Cf. also Clement, Strom. 1.143.1, discussed by Diels, loc. cit. 1916 Heft 6 p. 51 n. 2.

Omnesne tibi illi delirare visi sunt, qui sine manibus et pedibus constare deum posse decreverunt? ne hoc quidem vos movet, considerantes quae sit utilitas quaeque opportunitas in homine membrorum ut iudicetis membris humanis deos non egere? quid enim pedibus opus est sine ingressu? quid manibus, si nihil comprehendum est? quid reliqua descriptione omnium corporis partium, in qua nihil inane, nihil sine causa, nihil supervacaneum est? Itaque nulla ars imitari sollertiam naturae potest. habebit igitur linguam deus et non loquetur, dentes, palatum, fauces nullum ad usum, quaeque procreationis causa natura corpori adfinxit, ea frustra habebit deus, nec externa magis quam interiora, cor, pulmones, iecur, caetera quae detracta utilitate quid habent venustatis? quando quidem haec esse in deo propter pulchritudinem vultis.[17]

It is clear that we are on familiar ground; to pass from Origen to the reading of Cicero or Sextus is to become immediately aware that the Christian is merely taking over and slightly adapting the anti-Epicurean polemic of the Academy. The criticism made by Cotta that if the gods have bodies it is difficult to see to what use they put the various parts, is precisely that which Origen makes of the ecclesiastical doctrine of the resurrection of the body. The astonishing thing is that apparently this has not been pointed out earlier.

IV

The ultimate source of this argument is surely to be found in Plato, Timaeus 33, where the demiurge makes the world *σφαιροειδές*, not only because the sphere is the most perfect of all shapes, but also because it has no need of eyes or ears, lungs or mouth, hands or feet. If it did possess these, no use could be found for them. It is evident that all the presuppositions of the Epicurean-Academic debate on the anthropomorphic nature of the

[17] Cf. ibid. 1.29.80: "Ecquos, si non tam strabones, at paetulos esse arbitramur? ecquos naevum habere? ecquos silos, flaccos, frontones, capitones, quae sunt in nobis?" There is perhaps an affinity between this difficulty and Origen's enquiry whether men will have "hirsutum supercilium" and if "mulieribus laeves genae et angusta pectora, ad concipiendos et pariendos fetus venter et femora dilatanda sunt." (ap. Jerome, 378B). Cf. also Cicero, 1.35.99: "Tuus autem deus non digito uno redundat, sed capite, collo, cervicibus, lateribus, alvo, tergo, poplitibus, manibus, pedibus, feminibus, cruribus. si, ut immortalis sit, quid haec ad vitam membra pertinent? quid ipsa facies?"

gods are to be found expressed in this passage. And thus Origen's criticism of the church doctrine had an interesting history long before his time in the whole tradition of philosophical discussion since Plato. But the further question must now be raised, whether the Timaeus not only influenced Origen's criticism, but also helped to mould his positive conception of the resurrection body?

According to the letter of Justinian to the patriarch Menas, Origen affirmed that "in the resurrection the bodies of men rise spherical" (*σφαιροειδῆ*).[18] The same charge was repeated in the tenth anathema of the council at Constantinople in 543, and on the basis of this Koetschau marked a lacuna in de Principiis 2.10.3 supposing that Rufinus here followed his usual practice of omitting speculations likely to cause offense to the illiberal orthodoxy of his own day, and that originally Origen suggested explicitly the sphericity of resurrection bodies. If Koetschau is right, then the ultimate influence of the Timaeus is clear,[19] though the direct influence may not have been Platonic so much as Stoic.[20] But it is difficult to know how far the opinions attributed to Origen by Justinian really go back to Origen himself rather than merely to the monks of the New Laura in the sixth century who were the immediate cause of Justinian's action. No doubt the Origeniasts held views which were a definite advance on the modest speculations of their master; at least, one of the anathemas of the council at Constantinople in 543 is now known to be a quotation from Evagrius Ponticus and not from Origen at all,[21] so that it is clear that Justinian was not too careful to verify his references. In short, what we have in the anathemas is an ecclesiastical action arising directly out of the contemporary

[18] Mansi IX. 516 D, quoted by Paul Koetschau in his edition of de Principiis (1913) p. 176.

[19] This has been pointed out by Dr. W. L. Knox, 'Origen's Conception of the Resurrection Body,' in J.T.S. XXXIX (1938) pp. 247–8.

[20] According to the scholiast on Iliad 23.65, Chrysippus affirmed that souls *μέτα τὸν χωρισμὸν τοῦ σώματος σφαιροειδεῖς γενέσθαι*. Cf. H. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta II 815. Professor Nock kindly draws my attention to Seneca, Apocolocyntosis 8 where Claudius cannot become one of the Epicurean gods because they cause no trouble, though he may resemble a Stoic god in his rotundity. "Quomodo potest rotundus esse, ut ait Varro, sine capite, sine praeputio? Est aliquid in illo Stoici dei, iam video: nec cor nec caput habet."

[21] H. von Balthasar in Zeitschrift für kathol. Theol. LXIII (1939) p. 95. Cf. my remarks in J.T.S. XLVIII (1947) p. 43.

situation in the sixth century, and it is therefore vital to distinguish between Origen and those who claimed to be his followers.

The nearest approach that Origen makes to this doctrine is in the well-known passage, de Oratione 31.3, and it has been thought that it was superficial reading of this passage which led to this doctrine being attributed to Origen.[22] The whole passage is so relevant to the present discussion that I venture to attempt a translation. In the context he is discussing such problems as the right time and place and the most suitable posture for prayer. So he says:

And as kneeling is necessary when anyone is about to accuse himself to God of his own sins, and is supplicating that they may be healed and forgiven, we ought to realize that it is an outward sign of the humble and submissive man; as Paul says, "For this cause I bow my knees to the Father from whom every family in heaven and earth is named." But spiritual kneeling, which is so called because everything in existence has submitted to God "in the name of Jesus" and has humbled itself to Him, seems to me to be indicated by the apostle when he says "that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven and things on earth and things under the earth." (Phil. 2.10). But it is not in the least necessary to suppose that the bodies of the heavenly beings are so shaped as to have physical knees, since those who have discussed them in a scholarly way have proved that their bodies are spherical. Anyone unwilling to accept this will have to accept the notion that each limb has its uses, since otherwise God would have created parts for them which have no function, — unless he is prepared shamelessly to defy the canons of reason. In either case he will fall into difficulties, whether he says that God has provided them with useless bodily limbs which have no proper function, or if he affirms that even in the case of the heavenly beings the digestive organs and the large intestine perform their characteristic functions. It would be exceedingly stupid if anyone were to think that, like statues, it is only their outward appearance which has a human form and not their inner reality.[23] I say this as studying the meaning of

[22] Cf. C. Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria, (2nd ed. 1913) p. 272; G. Bardy, Recherches sur l'histoire du texte et des versions latines du De Principiis d'Origène (Paris, 1923) p. 60. The ambiguity of the passage is not noticed by F. Diekamp, Die Origenistischen Streitigkeiten im sechsten Jahrhundert (Münster, 1899) p. 48 note.

[23] *σθόδρα δὲ μωρῶς ἀναστραφήσεται, ἐὰν τρόπον ἀνδριάντων τις νομίζῃ τὴν μὲν ἐπιφάνειαν μόνην εἶναι ἀνθρωποειδῆ οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν βάθει.* For the antithesis

kneeling, and in consideration of the words "in the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, of things in heaven and things on earth and things under the earth." And the same argument applies to the saying written in the prophet: Every knee shall bow to me" (Isa. 45.23).

It is clear that here Origen is making no specific reference to the resurrection at all. When he speaks of *τῶν ἐπουρανίων τὰ σώματα*, he is primarily thinking of the "spheres" in the sense of the stars and the heavenly bodies generally. But Origen uses precisely the same arguments to prove that the spheres cannot bow the knee as he uses to prove that the resurrection does not mean that the physical and earthly body will be reconstituted.

Koetschau thinks that in his translation of de Princ. 2.10.3 Rufinus omitted the reference to the supposed sphericity of the resurrection body, and therefore marks a lacuna. But it is open to at least two serious objections. In the first place, there is no place in the Latin text where the sentence from Justinian can naturally be fitted. And, in fact, Koetschau simply marks the lacuna at the end of the paragraph; but there is little connection which might lead us to expect some such reference. And in the second place, there is the even greater difficulty that if in the de Principiis Origen had committed himself to any such suggestion, it becomes very difficult to see why this was not mentioned in the Origenistic controversy at the end of the fourth century. In fact, the greatest difficulty in the way of supposing Origen to have asserted the sphericity of the resurrection body is that neither Jerome nor Methodius says so. Both of them would have had every reason to mention this point, since it was their immediate object to draw attention to the offensive aspects of his doctrine. Yet neither of them expressly attributes this opinion to Origen. Methodius (de Resurrectione 3.15.1) asks Aglaophon what shape he supposes that the resurrection body will be. "Will it be in the shape of a circle, or a polygon, or a cube, or a pyra-

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between *ἐπιφάνεια* and *τὰ ἐν βάθει* compare, e.g., Clement Paed. 3.4.1. The simile *τρόπον ἀνδριάντων* quite clearly betrays again the influence of the Academic criticism of Epicurus. Cf. the Academic Cotta in Cicero, de Nat. Deor. 1.26.71: "Non est corpus, sed quasi corpus. hoc intelligerem quale esset, si id in ceris fingeretur aut fictilibus figuris." Ibid. 1.27.75: "Dicemus igitur idem quod in Venere Coa, corpus illud non est, sed simile corporis, nec ille fusus et candore mixtus rubor sanguis est, sed quaedam sanguinis similitudo; sic in Epicureo deo non res, sed similitudines rerum esse."

mid?" (ἆρα κυκλοτερὲς ἢ πολυγώνιον ἢ κυβικὸν ἢ πυραμοειδές;).[24] The sarcasm implies that this would be the logical corollary of the Origenist view, but suggests at the same time that he did not find this opinion expressed by Origen himself.

Nevertheless, it was perhaps this sentence of Methodius which may have been the cause of the supposition that Origen held this view. In his letter to Eustochium consoling her upon the death of her mother, Paula (Ep. 108), Jerome relates how Paula once met with a follower of Origen[25] who raised doubts in her mind about the resurrection of the flesh, asking whether there would be sexual differentiation in the next world, and maintaining that risen bodies would be *tenuia et spiritualia*. Jerome says that he went to the man and cross-questioned him; finding his answers unsatisfactory, he replied for him and drew his inferences from the other's premises; the risen Christ had shown his hands and feet — "ossa audis et carnem, pedes et manus; et globos mihi Stoicorum atque aeria quaedam deliramenta confingis" (Ep. 108.24, p. 343, ed. Hilberg). Again, it is difficult to know how far this is to be taken seriously; it reads as if Jerome is assuming that because the Origenists deny physical resurrection they must therefore follow the Stoics in supposing that disembodied souls are spherical.

What Origen really did say is preserved by Methodius and Jerome.

> So the body has well been called a river, since strictly speaking its primary substance does not perhaps remain the same even for two days; yet Paul or Peter are always the same, not merely with respect to the soul. . . . , because the form (εἶδος) which characterises the body remains the same, so that the marks which are characteristic of the physical quality of Peter and Paul remain constant; it is because of the preserving of this quality that scars caused in our youth persist in our bodies, and so with certain other peculiarities, moles and similar marks.

[24] Velleius in Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1.10.24 criticizes the Platonic opinion that the world is spherical (*rotundum*) because this is the most beautiful shape, saying: "At mihi vel cylindri vel quadrati vel coni vel pyramidis videtur esse formosior."

[25] Perhaps John of Jerusalem is the person in mind. Baronius suggested Palladius who lived at Bethlehem for a year with Posidonius the Theban, according to Hist. Laus. 36 (p. 107.1 ed. Butler). Cf. Vallarsi's note, I (Verona, 1734) p. 709 note b.

It is this same physical form (that which characterizes Peter and Paul) which the soul will again possess in the resurrection, though the form will then be much improved; but it will not be exactly as it was on earth. For just as a man has roughly the same appearance from infancy to old age, even if his features seem to undergo much change, so also there will be the same sort of relation between the earthly form and that to come. It will be the same although it will also be vastly improved. The reason for this is that wherever the soul is it has to have a body suitable for the place where it finds itself; if we were going to live in the sea we should need fins and scales like fishes; if we are to live in heaven, then we shall need spiritual bodies. The earthly form is not lost, just as the form of Jesus did not become quite different on the mount of the Transfiguration. (Origen ap. Method. 1.22.3–5).

In Jerome (adv. Joh. Hier. 26, 376C) we learn that one reason for the preservation of the earthly form is that it is only fair and just for the soul which has sinned in one body that it should be punished in that and not in another body: "Alia ratione resurrectionem corporum confitemur, eorum quae in sepulcris posita sunt, dilapsaque in cineres: Pauli Pauli, et Petri Petri, et singula singulorum, neque enim fas est ut in aliis corporibus animae peccaverint, in aliis torqueantur; nec justi judicis, alia corpora pro Christo sanguinem fundere, et alia coronari."

Those who held the popular doctrine could appeal to such scriptural passages as the story of the witch of Endor, or the parable of Dives and Lazarus, in which souls after death were described as still possessing human form. But Origen contends (ap. Method. 3.17) that the parable, rightly understood, affords no support to a theory which maintains physical resurrection, for the reason that the parable is describing the soul of Dives while in the waiting state, so to speak, and has no reference to the resurrection. In this state the soul apparently preserves the same shape as the gross and earthly body: *καὶ τάχα τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅμα τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ σχῆμα, ὁμοειδὲς ὂν τῷ παχεῖ καὶ γηΐνῳ σώματι, δύναται οὕτως λαμβάνεσθαι.* At any rate, according to all accounts ghostly apparitions have the form formerly possessed by the dead person. But this is before the end of the world and

the parousia, and is therefore before the resurrection. In this intermediate state the soul may appear in its ghostly form; so Plato (Phaedo 81D) spoke of the "shadowy apparitions" seen round tombs; and in the contra Celsum (2.60) we learn that the cause of these apparitions is that the soul is subsisting in what is called the luminous body: *τὰ μὲν οὖν γινόμενα περὶ ψυχῆς*[26] *τεθνηκότων φαντάσματα ἀπό τινος ὑποκειμένου γίνεται, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑφεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ αὐγοειδεῖ σώματι.*[27]

As against his opponents Origen also denied that any argument for the physical resurrection of the flesh could be based on the narratives in the Gospels about the resurrection of Jesus. For the body of Jesus was *sui generis*, as is immediately apparent from consideration of his virgin birth. Admittedly he ate and drank after the resurrection and showed the disciples his hands, his feet, and his side; yet he can pass through locked doors, and while breaking bread can vanish out of their sight.[28] And even before the resurrection certain things said about Jesus in the Gospels do not in any way correspond with our normal physical experience, as for example in the Transfiguration. It is clear to any careful reader of the Gospels that Jesus appeared differently to different people, and had many aspects (*ἐπίνοιαι*), so that his appearance varied according to the spiritual capacity of the beholder.[29] Since, therefore, his body manifested such peculiarities, it is hardly possible to use his body as a ground for the argument that our resurrection bodies will be the same as on earth. Such a doctrine of the humanity of Christ was perhaps well on the way towards docetism, but this never seems to have troubled Origen who, in this respect as in others, faithfully represents the Alexandrian Christological tradition.[30]

[26] For *ψυχῆς* which is the reading of the Vatican manuscript Koetschau, in his translation (1926–7), would read *μνημεῖα*.

[27] For the antecedents and later development of this idea of the *αὐγοειδὲς σῶμα* see E. R. Dodds, Proclus, The Elements of Theology (Oxford, 1933) pp. 313–321. In Origen, Comm. in Matt. 17.30, our resurrection bodies will resemble those of angels — *αἰθέρια καὶ αὐγοειδὲς φῶς*.

[28] Origen ap. Jerome loc. cit. (378B–379A), and ap. Methodius 1.26 and 3.12.

[29] For this idea which is fundamental to Origen's Christology cf. C. Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria (2nd ed. 1913) p. 209 ff.; Hal Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis. Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus (Berlin and Leipzig, 1932) p. 66 ff.; E. de Faye, Origène, III (Paris, 1928) p. 138 ff. Compare Methodius' criticisms in 3.12.

[30] Origen's usual phrase for the human nature of Christ is *ὁ κατὰ τὸν Ἰησοῦν*

In order to make the idea of a resurrection more intelligible to his pagan contemporaries, and to rationalize Christian doctrine by interpreting it in terms of Greek philosophy, Origen makes use of the Stoic conception of *σπερματικὸς λόγος*.[31] In I Corinthians XV Paul had conveniently compared the resurrection to the growth of a grain of wheat which has been sown in the ground. The power which causes the wheat to grow up lies in its seminal principle (c. Cels. 5.23): *λέγομεν γάρ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ κόκκου τοῦ σίτου ἐγείρεται στάχυς, οὕτως λόγος τις ἔγκειται τῷ σώματι, κτλ.* This notion of a *logos* in the body which makes it rise again after death is often put forward by Origen, e.g. in de Princ. 2.10.3 (V p. 176.6 ed. Koetschau); c. Cels. 7.32 (II p. 182.23) where the tabernacle of the soul has a *λόγον σπέρματος*. Similarly in Methodius 1.24.5; and ap. Jerome loc. cit. (376D).

Greek philosophy could also be called in to explain the transformation of the body by its doctrine that in its own nature matter was without qualities. The basic stuff of which the world was made was *ἄποιος ὕλη* and therefore the Creator might impose upon it such qualities as he might wish. In de Oratione 27.8 Origen summarizes the Platonic and Stoic definitions of *οὐσία*, saying that according to the Stoics *ἡ οὐσία ἐστὶν ἄποιός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἀποτεταγμένον ἔχουσα, πάσῃ δὲ ἔκκειται*[32] *ποιότητι καθάπερ ἕτοιμόν τι χωρίον.* Diogenes Laertius (7.134) attributes this doctrine directly to Zeno, and it was a commonplace in the doxographic handbooks to popular philosophy (cf. Diels, Doxogr. Gr. p. 308.6 and 458.8, and other references given by Koetschau on de Orat. 27.8; also Plotinus 2.41 ff.; Albinus, Epit. 8.2, p. 49 ed. Louis).[33] This could be turned to good account in order to make the notion of

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νοούμενος ἄνθρωπος, e.g. c. Cels. 2.25 (I p. 154.19 ed. Koetschau); 3.62 (p. 256.18); 4.65 (p. 336.7); 6.45 (p. 116.13); 7.16 (p. 167.22); Comm. in Joann. 20.12 (IV p. 341.23 ed. Preuschen); Comm. in Matt. 15.24 (X p. 420.12 ed. Klostermann) where the phrase stands in apposition to "the Son of Man"; de Orat. 30.2 (II p. 394.26 ed. Koetschau). Cf. c. Cels. 7.16 (p. 168.4): *ὁ ἐν τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀνθρώπῳ κατὰ τὸν Ἰησοῦν.*

[31] For Origen's use and modification of the Stoic theory of heredity cf. my remarks in J.T.S. XLVIII (1947) p. 44.

[32] So Wendland in Gött. gel. Anz. 1899 p. 293. The Trinity manuscript, followed by Koetschau, reads *ἔγκειται.*

[33] For the idea cf. Plato, Timaeus 51A. Origen alludes to it elsewhere in de Princ. 2.1.4; Comm. in Joann. 13.21.

the resurrection intellectually respectable, and it is so that Origen uses it with reference to the resurrection of Jesus in c. Cels. 3.41; 4.57; and 6.77.

V

In conclusion, one fundamental principle may be put forward for consideration. In any attempt to reconstruct Origen's theology of the resurrection full weight must be given to our primary authorities, Methodius and Jerome. Unless some further Origen find in Egypt [34] restores to us Origen's original discussion of the matter, we can perhaps never know exactly how he formulated his thought. But it must remain more than doubtful whether he ever in fact committed himself to the suggestion that in the resurrection we shall be spheres. On the contrary, the evidence points to the conclusion that he held to the continuance of personal identity in some form. And we have seen that the well-known passage in de Oratione 31.3 is primarily concerned with the denial that the heavenly bodies can bow the knee and that the Pauline text (Phil. 2.10) is to be interpreted literally. There is no specific reference in this passage to the resurrection. The two sentences in Methodius and Jerome which we have discussed above (p. 22) suggest, on the other hand, that the notion was an inference drawn either by his followers or by his opponents from his adoption of the Academic criticism of the Epicurean gods. However that may be, the critical examination of the evidence should warn us to be on our guard against blindly following Justinian, as is done by Koetschau and de Faye.[35] No doubt it is true that Justinian can be justified in so far as Neoplatonism had penetrated the monasteries under the cover of Origen's name. But if we are dealing with Justinian as an authority for the actual doctrine of Origen himself, difficulties immediately arise. I venture to think that the only question is how far he can safely be distrusted.

[34] There is as yet no information whether fragments of Origen's lost work on the resurrection have been found in the Toura-find; cf. M. O. Guéraud's article in Revue de l'Histoire des Religions, Jan. 1946.

[35] Cf. Koetschau's edition of the de Principiis (Leipzig, 1913) p. 176; de Faye, op. cit. III (1928) p. 253, who goes so far as to write: "Ce qui n'est pas contestable, c'est l'affirmation elle-même. Origène a conçu les corps ressuscités à la fois comme spirituels et sphériques."

LUTHER'S VIEW OF MAN IN HIS FIRST PUBLISHED WORK

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CONSIDERABLE INTEREST attaches, or should attach, to Martin Luther's tract entitled "Die Sieben puszpsalm mit deutscher auszlegung nach dem schrifftlichen synne tzu Christi vnd gottis gnaden, neben seyns selben ware erkentniss grundlich gerichtet." [1] Appearing [2] in the early spring of 1517, approximately half a year before the posting of the Ninety-five Theses, it is the first original publication that Luther himself saw through the press. Its success was instantaneous and widespread. As prominent a man as Johann von Staupitz lost no time in recommending it warmly.[3] Luther's searching analysis of the human situation made a deep impression upon the many readers who, like the author's superior in the Augustinian order, gave the slender volume an enthusiastic reception. It is important to bear in mind that the book, besides stirring Luther's scholarly friends as well as the learned in general rather more than he himself had anticipated, found immediate favor also with the "common man" for whom it had primarily been written. There is no exaggeration in the claim that Luther's earliest publication straightway established him as one of the most widely read writers in the German tongue: his unparalleled success as an author can safely be said to have begun with the very first book he ever put out. The popular demand for "Die sieben Busspsalmen" reached such proportions that the second printing was already underway before the first had been completely finished.[4] The book then went through a number of editions both regular and pirated: Wittenberg, Leipzig, Strassburg, and Erfurt printers published it between 1517 and 1525. In the

[1] WA I, 154–220.

[2] It was probably written in January and/or February, 1517, perhaps even in the last month or months of 1516. Cf. Luther's letter of March 1, 1517 to Lang.

[3] WA I, 155.

[4] Ibid. and WA XVIII, 467.

latter year Luther, though manifestly overburdened with other literary activities, felt called upon to edit a revised edition, "Die sieben Busspsalmen mit deutscher ausslegung verbessert durch Martin Luther," [5] which in turn was printed and reprinted several times in Wittenberg, Erfurt, Augsburg, and Dresden, the last known edition being as late as 1535. Thus for a period of almost twenty years, the first fruits of Luther's pen appeared again and again, surely a conclusive indication of extraordinary popularity.

The reasons for this unusual success are by no means obvious. While it is natural to assume that Luther's national and international prominence was partly responsible for the continued reprintings after 1517, the quick triumph of the first edition months before the Ninety-five Theses cannot be satisfactorily explained by more or less external factors. The remarkable public career of the man after 1517 must not be regarded as contributing to the astonishing effect produced by the editions prior to 1518. On the contrary, one is practically driven to the conclusion that it was essentially the intrinsic value of the book and its message which was the primary if not sole cause of its profound and wide appeal, certainly in the months before October 31, 1517. It should not be forgotten that Luther's reputation was local, regional at best, when he scored his first literary success, although it can of course not be denied that he had attained a measure of distinction even before the turning-point in his public life.

"Die sieben Busspsalmen" was, in a very real sense, the upshot of that comparatively peaceful quinquennium from 1512 to 1517, during which he was permitted, despite his many monastic duties and administrative functions, to devote himself largely to scholarly pursuits. These fairly quiet years of reflection, teaching, and study reached their acme in the preparation and publication of Seven Penitential Psalms, a work singularly free from strife and stress of an external kind.

If, as is argued here, it was chiefly, even exclusively, the purely religious ideas set forth by Luther that caused the book to be devoured by so diverse a public practically before the ink was dry, the question arises quite naturally: what was it that caught

[5] WA XVIII, 467–530.

the imagination of its impatient readers? exactly what was it that appealed to scholar and layman alike?

Two things impress the modern student eager to know the reasons for the striking success of Luther's first literary venture. It is an intensely personal record written in the white heat of passionate inquiry, and it presents within its relatively brief scope a whole philosophy or theology of life dealing as it does with fundamental problems of human existence. The reader senses instantly that he is under the spell of a searching mind individually concerned with what he is discussing: the book is, as Nietzsche wanted all books to be, written in blood. Moreover, the Christian view of life, supposedly long familiar, is seen in what must have seemed to contemporaries a new light. There is a splendor about the book and its bold re-interpretation of then prevalent ideas that cannot but have struck a responsive chord in the heart of every sensitive person. Still, after due credit has been given to the author, one should note the religious awareness of the man in the street who was ready to appreciate an admittedly difficult book proffering a challenging analysis of the meaning of Christian thought. An age not alive with religious questions could not have clamored for a treatise as exacting as "Die sieben Busspsalmen." People were definitely interested in discussions of the nature of man, and they must have found some help in the answer that Luther provided. What was the picture of man that the youthful Wittenberg professor presented in his earliest essay?

Luther's ideas are at once original and traditional. Far removed from humanistic thought, whether of the twelfth and thirteenth or of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, he moves pretty much within the strictly theological realm suggested by the names of Paul and Augustine. Luther's tract is, in fact, a most severe attack on and indictment of the encroachment of philosophy upon theology. Relentlessly he drives home the point that the comparative humanism of the world in which he lives is the principal foe that needs to be battled. The extreme theocentricity of Paulinet heology is to be enthroned again, completely, without the slightest trace of compromise with the contrary *Zeitgeist.*

The young scholar divides men into two main groups: the Old Man and the New. On both his thought is partly conventional and partly out of the beaten track. Beginning with his analysis of the Old Man we find that Luther is interested but very little in the common, ordinary sinner. The Old Man that he inveighs against is not primarily the thief, the murderer, the glutton, or the adulterer. It is hardly worth mentioning that Luther is of course as inflexibly opposed to such obvious sinners as the sternest moralist imaginable. But in his opinion, quite mature by 1517, this kind of Old Man, long recognized and universally fought against, is not the real or even the chief threat to a more profoundly interpreted Christian culture. All men with a modicum of interest in morality are patently against manifest vice. Luther's implied argument is that you don't have to be a Christian to recognize and hate flagrant sin. He is convinced that a Christian, far transcending the bounds of mere Moral Man, is, or should be, concerned with incomparably deeper issues beyond the question of conspicuous misdemeanor. As a matter of fact, what Luther suggests in his first publication is that a Christian *qua* Christian is troubled by matters quite different from those of easily recognizable moral conduct. To be sure, the path of the Christian is also beset with difficulties of this sort, and Luther therefore points them out in passing. Naturally, he is painfully aware of the prevalence of gross sin, and he does pay heed to it in the course of his analysis of the condition of man. What is important for a proper understanding of this essay however is that a consideration of the crass sinner does not loom very large here: though it is clearly there it plays an altogether subordinate rôle when compared with Luther's presentation of an infinitely more insidious kind of sin infecting all people without exception, even the apparently upright and just.

There cannot be any doubt about Luther's fundamental criticism of the ordinary sinner. He points out sharply that the breaker of the moral law does not fully realize the dire consequences of his acts in the hereafter.[6] If men really took the world to come as seriously as they should, they would think twice before committing sin or even reclining on a couch of ease.

[6] WA I, 163.

Martin Luther, himself consciously living in the face of eternity, finds it difficult to understand that people fully in earnest about the Last Judgment can love gaiety, riches, power, and glory as they so obviously do. Taking their pleasure in the good things of this world such as eating and drinking, clothing and housing,[7] they reveal to Luther that the divine judgment is not a living reality to them. Their daily life is in no manner fashioned by thoughts of the beyond. Luther the monk states solemnly and unequivocally that the flesh is to be persecuted without fail.[6] The only way in which Luther can explain this incomprehensible neglect of what to him is an overwhelming reality is man's stubborn refusal to believe in things eternal. Mournfully he concludes that the world just does not know any better; if it did, he is sure that it would quickly reconsider and mend its evil ways. Looking without as well as within, he has seen that man is inclined toward the transitory, forgetting the eternal in his keen preoccupation with the earthly. Luther is distressed no end to discover that inordinate love of temporal affairs tends to diminish more and more concern with heavenly things: what should be a richly flowing stream of interest in the divine is progressively dried up by man's attachment to the Here and Now.[8] With his unshaken faith in the world to come, Luther is saddened beyond words that so many give so little evidence that the faith they may still profess with their lips influences and shapes their daily lives. It is certain that he is in basic agreement with Nietzsche who once remarked that faith in the Christian hereafter and concomitant refusal to live accordingly are unmistakable signs of either utter foolishness or arrant criminality. There is little doubt that such men, however large their number, were not the ones he wished to address primarily in his first vernacular utterance. Their sins were so grievous and heinous in his eyes that he dealt with them just incidentally, restricting himself to pointing out the unbridgeable chasm existing between their actions and their words. Inasmuch as Luther was above all troubled by the question of man's situation in the sight of God, he merely recorded as it were his profound displeasure with gross

[7] WA I, 164.
[8] WA I, 197.

sin and sinners, particularly since such crimes lay pretty much within the jurisdiction of civil government. Perturbed by matters of infinitely greater weight in his view, he took up with vigor and insight the problem of man's existence before God. It is with this highest relationship then that Luther is almost exclusively concerned. The questions he tried to answer in this tract are those of the position of the Old Man and of the New Man before the seat of ultimate religious and ethical authority. We shall first examine the plight of the unredeemed sinner confronted with God.

The whole inwardness and amazing depth of Luther's thought dawn upon one when one remembers how markedly as moral a man as Sebastian Brant, the author of the most famous German book before Luther, differs from the latter in the approach toward and evaluation of human imperfection. What Brant attacks again and again, with pathos and bathos, in the Ship of Fools is what Luther all but passes over in Seven Penitential Psalms. While the humanist Brant attends almost exclusively to the outright vices and obvious sins of mankind, Luther endeavors to analyze the predicament of man in an infinitely more disturbing and upsetting manner. Though he is, naturally enough, as inveterate an enemy of open sin as Brant was or ever could be, Luther, the most kindred spirit Paul of Tarsus ever found, was not satisfied with showing up man's apparent foibles but went to what seemed to him to be the root of the trouble.

It goes without saying that this decision to see things whole took him far afield. Passionately concerned with ultimates, he emerged from his self-imposed task not so much the impatient detractor of indisputable vice as the sternest critic of the "good" men and women around him. Consciously disdaining to rail against the obvious and refusing to be just another voice in the chorus of the moralists of his generation, he proceeded to question the very "goodness" of those relatively few who strove to do justly and to love mercy. In a sense this was a shocking procedure on his part. With so much vice abroad in the land, with Rome practically burning, a Wittenberg professor, of some eminence to be sure but not yet of national or international prominence, undertook to arraign that distinguished minority which

honestly tried to live the good life. What effrontery! What folly! How did this mad professor dare to attack the salt of the earth, the people who really cared how they stood with God and who did express an active interest in the welfare of their fellows? Was it not, to say the least, impolitic and indiscreet to denounce the comparatively small number of those who were morally sensitive at all and to alienate men and women who made an honest effort to order their lives responsibly?

These are hard questions indeed. A satisfactory answer will not be found unless we are rather fully aware what manner of man this disquieting Augustinian really was. It is indispensable in this connection to recall some salient facts of his previous inner development. Whatever may have been the exact motives that drove the young master of arts and student of law into the monastery, once its doors had closed behind him he was a monk with all his heart and mind and soul. Not to be outdone by any of his fellow-monks, he resolutely strove to fulfill his every obligation, succeeding so well in his sincere endeavor that not even Heinrich Denifle, his modern archenemy, could detect any evidence to the contrary. He had been an upright man before he took the decisive step, and now he tried vigorously to increase in goodness and to hitch his wagon to the star of moral perfection. The outcome of these long and arduous labors was the painful discovery that the goal he had set for himself seemed ever out of reach, constantly receding while he pursued it hotly. It should perhaps be noted that in his ceaseless striving for irreproachable moral goodness his idea of what was morally good underwent progressive deepening and expansion. There is reason to think that he would probably have attained his goal if he had retained the concept of the good with which he had entered the monastery and which apparently rather satisfied him even in the earlier years of his monastic life.[9] But the more he reflected on the nature of the good and the more earnestly he devoted himself to the study of the Scriptures, the more his uncertainty as to whether he was really advancing in his religious pursuits increased and weighed upon him.

[9] Cf. H. Bluhm, "The Significance of Luther's Earliest Extant Sermon," The Harvard Theological Review, XXXVII (1944), 175–184.

We are fortunate enough to possess some remarkable literary records of his incessant struggle for more moral insight. Among the most precious documents clearly attesting to his spiritual growth are his university lectures on the Psalter, delivered from 1513 to 1516. Especially the lectures on the first psalm [10] are a moving account of his unending wrestling with the problem and of his seeing the first glimmer of light on the new path on which he was, but few years later, boldly to lead much of Europe out of what might very fairly be called its moral complacency. By the time he began to lecture on Paul's Epistle to the Romans, in 1515, he was wholly in the clear, theoretically at least, and his characteristic view of the nature of the good had burst into full bloom. By 1515 at the very latest, his specific ideas on God and man and their mutual relationship had fully emerged. The work-laden years of the monk, priest, preacher, and professor had borne rich fruit. His heart and head were filled to overflowing with a "new" message or, to be more exact, with one that had long been forgotten. Luther, surveying the world in which he lived and moved, must have felt many a time, certainly since 1514 or 1515, that he had something important to say to his contemporaries. It is not at all improbable that in certain moments of heightened awareness and introspection he may have harbored the notion that the world was out of joint and that he was born to set it right. At any rate, the urge to penetrate beyond academic and monastic confines was partially gratified by ascending the pulpit and preaching to the people of Wittenberg. The great popularity and pronounced success he won as a preacher doubtless increased his ambition to give an even wider circulation to the religious ideas which were so enthusiastically and gratefully received by town and gown. A definite message, won in intense personal struggle, and the understandable desire to share the answer he had found inevitably put the pen in his eager hand. It cannot have taken him long to realize that, in addition to his proved mastery of the spoken word, he also had an extraordinary gift to express himself readily in the writing of the vernacular. His incredible powers as a writer cannot but

[10] It is quite possible, for these assertions, to limit oneself to the portions written down in 1513.

have inspired him to go on to greater heights as a mover of men's minds. By the beginning of 1517, perhaps already before the end of 1516, he sat down and, for the first time in his life thus far, wrote a Goethean confession of faith in that language in which he was so soon to become a past master.

What the modern reader, weighing the intrepidness of the man's first attack upon generally prevailing ideas of the age, should ever bear in mind is that this severe book with all its harshness and even rashness was anything but the chance product of an irresponsible mind hungry to create a sensation. Instead, it is quite important to remember that "Die sieben Busspsalmen" was only the next further step that had to be taken after the preliminary work of the early university lectures and popular sermons: logically and psychologically, the evolution toward the German tract was both natural and inevitable. Responsibility rather than irresponsibility is the keynote of the new prophet. He could no longer withhold from the largest possible number the profoundly satisfying answer he had found after so many years of seeking. In an ever-expanding circle, from the lonely cell via the lecture hall and the pulpit, his course had taken him by 1517 to the forum where the whole nation could hear his voice: the German book. And the nation to which he addressed himself did listen. That it did listen so attentively to the difficult fare the famous professor placed before it surely redounds to its everlasting credit. Students of Luther have always marvelled that the common man read the challenging works as eagerly as he did. The author on whose lips he hung did not flatter him in the least. On the contrary, he mercilessly tore the mask of respectability off his face. It is little short of miraculous to behold that so tremendously serious a writer as Luther found a reading public of then unparalleled dimensions.

We had noticed that Luther refers only very briefly to the straightforward sinner, the ordinary idea of the Old Man. The preponderant majority of his utterances on the Old Man deal with a highly refined, inner conception of sin, a conception so inclusive that all men, even the best among them, are almost automatically classified as sinners. In no uncertain terms the Augustinian monk, disdaining to write at length on his basic hostility

to the kind of open sin that everybody could easily detect, insisted vigorously that the way of life of what would commonly be called a good and just man is essentially evil and unjust and must therefore perish.[11] The strangeness of this view of man does not keep Luther from believing it can be grasped by the average man, else he would not have spent a whole lifetime, beginning with "Die sieben Busspsalmen," to expound it in detail over and over again.

Still, despite his hope — stronger to be sure in his youth than with the advancing years — that men would flock to his standards, there is discernible even in his earliest publication the uncomfortable realization that his is the voice of one crying in the wilderness. There is no doubt that Germany and Europe at large are overcrowded with theologians and priests. Yet all of them, with practically no exception of which Luther is aware, preach in an altogether different strain.[12] Their preaching is of course not immoral; far from it, it is very moral. In fact, the exhortation to live morally is at the very heart of their earnest preaching. Luther fully recognizes that they admonish their equally serious audiences to lead exemplary lives, and he freely admits that both clergy and laity exert themselves in many instances to their utmost in their concern for morality.

It is such preachers and such listeners, the very cream of Christian society, that Luther felt constrained to single out for his first major attack. These respectable men and women he identifies most closely, almost to the exclusion of ordinary sinners, with the Old Man. He spares no word in his assault upon their supposedly firm ramparts. Without the least perceptible hesitation he calls them "the most unrighteous" [13] of all men, immeasurably worse than the most hardened sinners. In an impassioned passage he goes so far as to designate these pillars of church and state as the real as well as the only enemies Christendom has ever had in the past, has now in the present, and ever will have in the future.[14] Nobody wars against the essence of the Christian religion more fiercely or more fundamentally than these apparently model people, looked up to by their less rigorous fellows and generally held in highest esteem.

[11] WA I, 162. [12] WA I, 218. [13] WA I, 164. [14] Ibid.

In order to do a measure of justice to Luther's easily misunderstood pitiless onslaught it should always be borne in mind that he is here concerned with Christians, not with non-Christians no matter how high their ethical striving. Naturally Luther is far from denying that these valiant souls are sincerely working for, and sometimes even attaining, a considerable degree of justice and righteousness. Philosophically and humanly speaking, their eager search for the moral life is admirable and ever to be encouraged. If Aristotelian ethics were valid for Christians, all would be well, and Luther would either hold his peace or, what is more likely, join the throng of those devoted preachers untiringly urging their congregations to greater efforts in the quest for self-improvement. But for Martin Luther, primarily interested in re-establishing and preserving the uniqueness of the Christian message, the Aristotelian and even Thomistic conceptions of the righteousness required of men before God are basically wrong. While Aristotelian ethics, being a system of natural and philosophical ethics, will obviously do for pre-Christian and extra-Christian society, it is in Luther's opinion utterly inadequate within the Christian dispensation. At the heart of the Christian religion there is according to him a totally different idea of righteousness. The core of Luther's adamant opposition to the Christian church of his day resides in this very fact. It is not too much to say that the entire Lutheran Reformation springs from the early realization on the part of Luther that Christianity had largely forgotten its original genius and that it had consequently lost its mark of distinction.

Luther is therefore quite willing to concede that the earnest Christians of his generation possess all sorts of wisdom and justice except what he holds to be authentic *Christian* justice and wisdom.[15] With all their resplendent goodness and their tireless pursuit of righteousness they lack the one thing needful, the only thing that makes one a Christian, namely, the righteousness that dwells in the cross of Christ. Insisting on this theology of the cross and its central significance for Christianity, Luther harshly charges that no one in the whole wide world fights more vehemently against Christ and the meaning of the cross than these

[15] Ibid.

would-be saints.[16] Paradoxical as it may seem on the surface, the first are told that they are the last. Those who would rank highest in a human theory of justice are bluntly informed that they are lowest in the divine reckoning as revealed to Christians in the Scriptures. This judgment above all is the revolutionary note in the first book Luther published under his name.

The reasons for this Pauline-Augustinian view of man as held by Luther are not far to seek. So far as Luther himself is concerned, it is now agreed among informed Catholics and Protestants alike that he took God, God's relation to man, and man's relation to God exceedingly seriously, measuring all things by divine standards as set forth in the Bible. In the light of the moral requirements laid down there, Luther was compelled to admit that man's *seemingly* good works are not *really* good at all. Now those who strive after the moral life, i.e., actually the elite of men, have fallen prey to the idea that their noble deeds, often wrested from their resisting flesh, are worthy of being considered by God. In other words, their seemingly good works have made a fairly strong impression upon them.[17] Subtly they have been led to take pleasure in their own piety,[18] especially since it shines so brightly when compared with the obvious impiety of the multitude of men that do not care in the least. Their inner satisfaction with themselves, so easy to understand on the one hand, causes them on the other hand to love their own achievement in spiritual things even more than coarse sinners love fleshly things.[19] It is their very eminence over their less spiritually concerned fellowmen which becomes their pitfall. They are pleased with what they have accomplished, and they think highly of themselves. Such an attitude Luther cannot but call the greatest blindness on earth.[20]

Earnestly Luther recalls to them and to himself that all men are unrighteous in the sight of God.[21] No matter how disagreeable or difficult the thought, the plain fact is that this situation before God applies not only to the ordinary sinner but also to those who exercise themselves in works of righteousness hoping thereby to get away from the unrighteousness of which they are so keenly

[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] WA I, 165.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] WA I, 167.

aware. It is these morally sensitive people who have to be told over and over again that they cannot possibly work their way out of their fundamental unrighteousness. The highest act of which they are capable is thus condemned as the cause of their undoing before God. Although he fully realizes that he will shock the "just," Luther, bound by the word of God as he understood it, made bold to proclaim that those who strive to free themselves from sin are damned because of this very effort. Whoever regards himself as pious and takes consolation in his works,[22] has not yet succeeded in knowing either himself or the God of the Bible. He has not yet come face to face with his real self as the word of God requires him to do. As long as a man thinks he can approach God by his own works,[23] he belongs in Luther's judgment to the self-wise [24] who teach the righteousness of men [25] rather than the righteousness that avails before God. Thinking themselves wise they actually ascribe to themselves the honor solely due to God: [26] instead of humbly permitting themselves to be justified, they proudly wish to achieve their own justification. Their ignorance of what constitutes the essence of sin in God's view is little short of catastrophic; they are charged by Luther not to penetrate beyond externals in that they fear God's judgment only in their manifestly evil deeds but not in their so-called good ones.[27] Itching to be something by their own strength,[28] they are thereby automatically excluded from becoming "material" with which God is willing to work.[29] The almost insuperable difficulty resides in the fact that the "holy, all-too-holy" cannot be brought to a real experience of God's anger [30] and of their own sin. Recklessly, they take themselves to be the most religious of all men.[31] The root of the trouble is that they refuse to follow God beyond what they can see with their own eyes; they insist, stubbornly, on understanding and comprehending God. After all has been said and done, they really throw in their lot with human reason,[32] thereby declining to accept revelation as contained in the Bible. What they fail to see, because of their faith in human reason, is that good works not proceeding

[22] Ibid.
[23] WA I, 188.
[24] WA I, 180.
[25] WA I, 192.
[26] WA I, 202.
[27] WA I, 213.
[28] WA I, 183.
[29] WA I, 184.
[30] WA I, 175.
[31] WA I, 172.
[32] Ibid.

from divine grace are downright impious and unacceptable in God's sight.[33] Thus all their moral striving must be adjudged to be in vain. Fighting the good fight in their opinion, they are nevertheless losing it. In their seeming justice they really war against true justice.[34] The refusal to live steadfastly in the *via crucis* [35] and the failure to direct their attention away from themselves to God,[36] mar all their well-intentioned acts.[37] It makes no difference how their "good" works shine before men; they fool themselves if they hope to attain salvation in this human way.[38] Following the light of reason with arrogance, they commit the grave error of shunning the only force that counts in these matters, faith.[39] In their blindness they reach for Christ's own seat of judgment, allowing what seems rational to them to usurp the place of the revealed scheme of salvation, which has to be appropriated by faith and can never be apprehended and comprehended by reason.

Thus in a bold sweep Luther has led his readers to see that lack of faith is the essential and ultimate characteristic of the Old Man. The ordinary sinner in the workaday sense of the word moves in a realm so far below Luther's thought that he does not labor the patent point that such a reprobate individual is of course guilty and deserves to be punished. But as long as we merely deal with a relatively crude notion of sin, we have not yet, according to Luther, reached the deep places of Christian thought. If Christianity really meant a break with the philosophy of the ancient world, it is necessary to keep it on that high level of intellectual protest. It is basic to recall that a sinner in the genuine Christian sense is a person who insists on the (relative to be sure) goodness of his striving and who, whether directly or by implication, rejects in this way the righteousness which God offers him *per Christum*. The refusal to accept Christ as the full propitiator is the very heart of unbelief. It is then this unbelief in Christ, or this belief in oneself, that constitutes the real nature of the Old Man according to Luther. Anything below this profound interpretation of sin belongs, in Luther's view, to extra

[33] WA I, 170.
[34] WA I, 179.
[35] WA I, 164.
[36] WA I, 166.
[37] WA I, 164.
[38] WA I, 215.
[39] WA I, 217.

Christian thinking. In his later terminology all those believing in, and living by, *iustitia activa* are in the category of the Old Man. Whoever does not find his full salvation imputed to him in the "justice of God," [40] must needs be held to be far from the Kingdom of God.

It goes without saying that the religious thinker who had such a penetrating conception of the nature of the Old Man may be expected to have reflected just as keenly on the nature of the New Man. We shall now turn to a brief consideration of the ideal that Luther placed before the astonished eyes of his contemporaries.

Just as little as the Old Man was primarily, if indeed at all, an ordinary sinner or criminal, the New Man is not simply an upright individual in the usual meaning of that phrase. In fact, we have already found that this sort of respectable citizen is, for Luther at any rate, the veritable embodiment of the Old Man as he saw him. Since the New Man as commonly conceived is only the Old Man when thoroughly analyzed, Luther's idea of the New Man must be something radically and fundamentally different from the non-Lutheran picture. So it is.

The chief quality of the New Man is according to Luther first and foremost a profound conviction that he is every inch a sinner before God. He is of course aware that the life he is apt to lead is outwardly above reproach and that he is thus regarded as a valuable, even a model, member of society. He is just as sure of his good standing in civil estate as he is of his utter failing in the sight of God. It is this honest insight into his total sinfulness face to face with God which first starts him on the road to the New Man. However spotless and law-abiding he may be in the eyes of the world, and however much he may have to agree with his fellow-citizens that he is more than pulling his weight in communal and personal life, he nevertheless fully agrees with God's judgment of himself: he is in every aspect a lost sinner.[41] Graciously he has been led to recognize more and more that his supposed piety, of which he himself may have boasted if ever so little, is in truth nothing but sin when God's standards are ap-

[40] WA I, 184.
[41] WA I, 159; 207.

plied.[42] Luther knows full well that the attainment of this knowledge of the self is no easy matter. Without a searching inquiry into one's ultimate motives it is impossible to begin to reach it. Since many refuse to examine themselves to this extent, they cannot understand why a model citizen and friend, whom they probably admire and may even try to emulate, should consider himself to be in reality an abject sinner. That is precisely the reason why Luther asserts time and again that nobody can become a New Creature without the deepest experience of his sinfulness. It is indispensable to have lain in the dust before God and to have cried out in contrition and terror.[43] To have been alone with God and to have found oneself wanting are necessary prerequisites: without a trembling conscience in the encounter with God [44] there is no path open into the realm of the New Man.

This shattering experience, on the absolute necessity of which Luther dwells with extraordinary eloquence, is of course only the first step on the narrow way leading into the promised land. If terror and anguish of soul predominate in the earliest phase of the New Man, profound happiness and serenity, even gaiety,[45] take possession of him after he has come through the dark valley and entered into his *vita nuova*. As Luther sees it, the New Man has God and has Him more abundantly. Within the proper limits, there is a good deal of mystic God-intoxication in Luther's conception of the New Man. Perhaps the word "gratitude" is more appropriate, although it is almost too sober a term to express the overflowing emotions of joy that well up in the heart of the New Man upon realizing, even if only darkly, the peace that now exists between God and himself. When sinful man comprehends that God has deigned to draw nigh to him, his gratefulness knows no bounds and he can, with a full heart, rejoice in the Lord who has thus made him glad.

The profound happiness which has taken hold of the New Man, never to let him wholly go even in the darkest hours of *Anfechtung* still to come, is the result of a very definite experience. It has not come about because of some ineffable vision

[42] WA I, 168.
[43] WA I, 169.
[44] WA I, 175.
[45] WA I, 173.

(though that was by no means lacking in Luther's life) but because of a particular revelation of closely circumscribed content. Luther assumes of course that the individual privileged to become a New Man has long and ardently hungered and thirsted after righteousness.[46] It is no exaggeration to say that he has trodden the road of *justitia activa* most persistently and watchfully. In pursuing his one goal of righteousness he has come as it were to his wit's end. With this experience of trying infinitely hard behind him and with the bitter realization that his life is still essentially sinful, he makes the great discovery that righteousness is not won or earned by his own efforts but that it is *given* him by God.[47] This marvelous insight releases the severe tension under which he had struggled on and on and which is now replaced by the gratitude, serenity, and deep joy described above. Theologically speaking, he has moved from the territory of *justitia activa* to that of *justitia passiva*. Between these two there is a difference of kind, not of degree only. The individual is literally transplanted from one realm of discourse into another, into a wholly other. It was Luther's conviction and contention that this world of *justitia passiva* was largely unknown in his generation [48] and that it was his peculiar mission to re-open the gates to this all but forgotten spiritual realm. This re-discovered universe of God-given righteousness was the real moving force behind all of Luther's activities. It was this fundamental idea which gave unity to the various aspects and phases of the Reformation upon which he was to embark "officially" less than a year after his first publication. In evaluating the man it is necessary ever to keep before one's eye the inner motives which fashioned the course of the outer events as far as Luther himself shaped them. It should never be lost sight of that the intellectual principles of the Lutheran Reformation were fully and firmly established and pronounced months before the storm broke.

The "righteousness which avails before God" is the religious idea by which the New Man is both created and sustained. Since this life-giving power is found only in the Bible, Luther placed the word of God upon a pinnacle towering above that which the medieval church had reserved for it. Thus Luther can say that

[46] WA I, 163. [47] WA I, 218. [48] WA I, 189.

the word of God is the whole content of the New Man.[49] It is the Bible that contains God's declaration that He is gracious to the sinner. The New Man therefore clings to this word of God which alone tells him of a divine righteousness that is given him. So far as the reasonableness of such a life in and by God's word is concerned, the New Man knows from the start that it passes reason altogether[50] and that he moves wholly in the realm of faith. In religion it is revelation that matters.

It is possible to emphasize too much the peace attained and the joy experienced by the New Man. These states of mind, while doubtless undergirding the structure of the new life, are not always visibly present. With his eyes fixed upon the goal, the New Man is still very much a part of this world with its many troubles and tribulations. He realizes the necessity of constant growth[51] as long as he lives on earth, and he knows that he has fallen in the past and that he is apt to fall again until he departs this life and enters the beyond. But he is none the less sure that he has found an anchor from which no earthly storm can ever wholly loose him.

In an unforgettable image, suggested by the psalmist, Luther describes the life of the New Man. While the world is asleep in its sin, the New Man is wide awake and fully conscious of his shortcomings. Luther likens the world to a house whose residents slumber soundly. The New Man however, concerned with the things that are God's, rouses himself from his sleep and betakes himself to the roof of the house. This watching on the housetop symbolizes the intermediate position he occupies. He is not wholly in the world any more as his sleeping companions in the house are. Yet he is not completely in heaven either. With heaven above and the world beneath him he hovers between time and eternity, between this earth and the beyond.[52] The suggestion that he is all alone in his watching expresses Luther's belief that those who are really heaven-bent constitute a small minority. Young as he still was in 1517, Luther had already fully realized that the number of men and women humble enough to be ready

[49] WA I, 209.
[50] WA I, 171.
[51] WA I, 186; 190.
[52] WA I, 199.

to *receive* rather than to *achieve* the required righteousness was alarmingly and distressingly limited.[53]

The New Man then is the rare creature which, having come to the end of his own resources, is granted the vision that he must make a complete about-face. Though his inner resources are usually ampler than those of his more ordinary fellows, he has been led to believe that salvation does not lie in man's "active" striving but in his "passive" reception of the gift of that righteousness which God demands.

At the end of this brief presentation of Luther's early view of man we may perhaps be permitted to make some general statements about the work here analyzed. First of all, there is the matter of the amazing maturity of Luther's initial publication. In practically every essential aspect his theology appears to be fully developed or at least very near completion. This is of course not as surprising to us in the twentieth century as it would or should have been to earlier generations of scholars. The discovery and subsequent publication of the Lectures on Romans, delivered by Luther in 1515 and 1516, showed us in the first decade of our century how very far his theological thought had progressed by 1515. The significance of "Die sieben Busspsalmen," in which similarly mature views are uttered, is partly to be found in the fact that this work was the first ever to be published by Luther himself. The Latin Lectures were intended for a restricted academic audience, and they were not made available to the public by Luther. Thus the first clear indication of what the celebrated professor, preacher, and prior meant was contained in the modest little book we have examined. It is, like its more famous brother "Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen," small in size but of extraordinary importance embracing as it does the whole sum and substance of the Christian life. The German people as a whole received their first definite impression of what the Wittenberg friar was really after from this tract.

This fact of major historical interest does not, however, exhaust the significance of the work under review. It contains the gist of the ideas that Luther was prepared to lay before a larger public. The great early Latin Lectures on Psalms and Romans

[53] WA I, 217.

include much more than Luther actually communicated to even an intelligent student body. Only the notes taken by students give us, when compared with Luther's own manuscript, a rough idea of how little he saw fit to place even before an academic audience. In "Die sieben Busspsalmen" on the other hand we find what he was ready to submit, under his name, to the entire German reading public. This work was written for publication and presents thus the first formulation of the view of God and man that was to resound throughout Europe and to shake that continent to its foundations. From this point of view the significance of "Die sieben Busspsalmen" is almost incalculable.

Inasmuch as this treatise is a distinguished first statement of Luther's basic position in matters of religion, we may ask in conclusion which place he occupies in the history of Christian thought. The answer, which can be fully given on the strength of his earliest publication, is clear beyond all doubt: Luther has recovered the ground on which Paul stood. This is, by implication, the negation and rejection of the Greek view of man whether in its original expression or its modification and medieval adaptation by Scholasticism. The Reformation, even before it officially began, had at the earliest possible moment made it abundantly clear that it was minded to break with all compromises Christianity had entered into with Greek philosophy and to restore the non-Hellenic theology of Paul. In all matters affecting man's relation to God, the rational approach of the Greeks was abandoned once more in favor of the full acceptance of irrational revelation so strongly insisted upon by Pauline Christianity. Considerably more than a thousand years of "alliance" with the Greek spirit had come to an end with the publication of Luther's first work. Consciously or unconsciously, Luther pitted himself staunchly from the start against the chief representative of the great compromise, Thomas Aquinas. Standing on the shoulders of Paul and Augustine, Luther put all orthodox Christians of the West into two irreconcilable camps, Lutherans and Thomists, a division that still applies whether we always realize it or not.

JONATHAN EDWARDS ON THE SENSE OF THE HEART

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The reputation of Jonathan Edwards, impressive though it is, rests upon only a fragmentary representation of the range or profundity of his thinking. Harassed by events and controversies, he was forced repeatedly to put aside his real work and to expend his energies in turning out sermons, defenses of the Great Awakening, or theological polemics. Only two of his published books (and those the shortest), The Nature of True Virtue and The End for which God Created the World, were not *ad hoc* productions. Even The Freedom of the Will is primarily a dispute, aimed at silencing the enemy rather than expounding a philosophy. He died with his Summa still a mass of notes in a bundle of home-made folios, the handwriting barely legible. The conventional estimate that Edwards was America's greatest metaphysical genius is a tribute to his youthful Notes on the Mind — which were a crude forecast of the system at which he labored for the rest of his days — and to a few incidental flashes that illumine his forensic argumentations. The American mind is immeasurably the poorer that he was not permitted to bring into order his accumulated meditations.

Had he written the book he planned, he would have called it A Rational Account of the Main Doctrines of the Christian Religion Attempted. That he wanted to construct one more rational defense shows him a man of his century, but Edwards' effort would have been a different affair from Locke's or Addison's or from the interminable refutations of Deism. It would, I think one may safely say, have been a unique creation; the premises would have been the dominant ones of the age — Newton's mechanics and Locke's sensationalism — but these would have been maintained with a logical rigor beyond Newton's or Locke's, and from them, impelled by his theological and aesthetic passion, Edwards would have reached religious conclusions that would have transcended the Age of Reason and anticipated Kierkegaard.

The manuscript of notes for this project, tentatively entitled Miscellaneous Observations and now reposing in Yale University Library, consists of over 1200 entries of varying lengths. In it the rudimentary positions of the Notes on the Mind are progressively elaborated. Two

volumes of excerpts were published in the 1790's [1] by editors who culled out only controversial or disputatious passages, so that the major part of his pure speculation remains buried. Were it published, even in its disconnected state, the manuscript could give to American literature a volume of Pensées that would not suffer by comparison with Pascal's.

The fragment here reproduced, with the generous permission of Yale University Library, is numbered 782 in the series; it probably dates from Edwards' later years in Northampton and may be roughly ascribed to about 1745. It reveals, as do many entries, how complete was his conversion to the empirical, sensational psychology of John Locke, whom he read with ecstasy — the word is not too strong — when an undergraduate at Yale. Though there were other intellectual influences in his life — Calvin, the traditional body of Puritan science, Cudworth, and Hutcheson — yet Locke and Newton were far and away the dominating sources, and from them he acquired almost all his theoretical starting points. This statement, which may seem extreme, is worth emphasizing, for Edwards is generally rated an "idealist" and a "Puritan Platonist" (when he is not remembered merely as the preacher of the fiery pit!); the peculiar and fascinating character of his achievement is entirely lost if he be not seen as the first and most radical, even though the most tragically misunderstood, of American empiricists. He adopted the sensational psychology with a consistency that outdoes the modern "behaviorist." Yet, though starting from Locke, he did not follow the broad highway that led through Hume and the Utilitarians to Herbert Spencer; protected by his isolation in the Connecticut valley against the exclusively epistemological orientation of British thought, and supplied in advance by his religious nature with certain insights, he innocently took the sensational psychology to mean something entirely other than that ideas are merely copies of original impressions or that because ideas are impressed upon the creature through sensation, the creature is therefore always passive clay upon which experience rains down. He was either too profound or too unsophisticated — or perhaps both — to become side-tracked by the genial scruples of a Hume. A hundred and fifty years later, when William James reverted to "the good Locke" in order to rescue the empirical method from the Spencerian charnel house and attempted to restate the psychological relation of subject and object in terms that would discount a whole century of preoccupation with the thing-in-itself, he was unwittingly resuming where Edwards had been

[1] Miscellaneous Observations on Important Theological Subjects, Edinburgh, 1793.

Remarks on Important Theological Controversies, Edinburgh, 1796.

forced to leave off. Had Edwards been able to publish his "Rational Account," James would have had a mighty American precedent for his stand against both psychological atomism and transcendental categories.

The present extract gives some indication of how intensely Edwards' mind was working. The discourse takes flight from Locke's Book III, Of Words, and the essential contention is that words are arbitrary signs affixed by social convention to ideas received only from sensory experience. Words, said Locke, are nothing but sounds which man uses as signs of internal conceptions, which he makes "stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind." To summarize crudely, Locke's notion of the mechanism was that the mind receives sensations in the form of ideas; after, and only *after*, a particular impression has been registered does the mind give it a name. Ever afterwards, by speaking the name, a man may "almost as readily excite certain ideas as if the objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the senses." [2]

What charmed Locke about this doctrine is obvious: it consolidated his victory over innate ideas. If there was nothing in the mind that made a word significant until the mind had sensible experience of the object which the word signified, if no man could find a pre-existent concept in his mind which was stimulated or produced from within upon hearing the word, if language was merely a social convention by which certain noises were connected with certain experiences by those who had the experiences and only after they had them, then his fundamental thesis, that there is nothing in the mind until sensation puts it there, was doubly proved. Edwards takes all this for granted, as though irrefutably established.[3] But for him the all-important consequence is that the word,

[2] An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, III, Chap. I, Par. 1; Chap. II, Par. 6.

[3] Detailed evidence is lacking, but I suspect (and I believe that more patient study of the Edwards manuscripts than I have yet had leisure for would confirm) that Edwards' immediate and incisive reaction to his first reading of Locke came from the fact that he, being as he was preternaturally sensitive to the full implications of a concept, was more aware than most of his contemporaries, certainly more than any in New England, that Puritanism, and Protestantism in general, had from the beginning suffered from an ambivalent attitude on the question of innate ideas. The Harvard theses of the seveteenth century exhibit a ludicrous alternation of positions that probably reflects a fluctuation of opinion among the authorities. The ultimate reasons for this confusion are not far to seek. The body of the liberal arts in Puritan education included the Physics, which in turn included the doctrine of the nature and faculties of man, and was carried down intact from the medieval curriculum; its fundamental assertion was that nothing could be in the mind that was not first in the senses. On the other hand, the theological doctrine was derived from Calvin and ultimately from Augustine; though not always aware of the ultimate source, Puritan theology and homiletics, apart from Puritan Physics, always showed a tendency to assume that sensations merely aroused or occasioned ideas

according to this doctrine, becomes *detachable* from the sensation. It can be spoken separately by those who have forgotten the experience, by those who barely felt it, even by those who never had it and have no "actual idea" of the experience at all. The actual idea is a living thing *vis-a-vis* the source of the experience; if the impact of the experience grows dim, if the sensation subsides into a shadowy memory, the word, now become a motor habit, may be used *as though* the experience were still actual and so cease to be anything but a hollow sound. Even within the sensational psychology, or rather because of it, men may be living in a hazy, remote, dull relationship with reality.

From this state — which is original sin — they must be redeemed.

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already latent in the mind and that learning was a species of recollection. There was so much of Augustine in even the rudest of Puritan parsons, who may have read no Augustine at first hand, that they were constantly telling their congregations in effect: "To give them as much credit as possible, words possess only sufficient efficacy to remind us in order that we may seek things, but not to exhibit things so that we may know them," or "Referring now to all things which we understand, we consult, not the speaker who utters words, but the guardian truth within the mind itself, because we have perhaps been reminded by words to do so" (De Magistro, Pars. 36, 38, trans. George G. Leckie, New York 1938). New England sermons, before Edwards, abound with *ad hominem* passages that tacitly assume even in fallen men the persistence of a guardian truth within that needed not so much instruction as awakening.

However, though seventeenth-century Puritanism was sadly muddled on the issue, the problem was not important, for the existential problems of conversion and the practical problems of polity and politics absorbed all attention. Whether innate ideas did or did not exist was an academic topic, fit for discussion at Harvard commencements but not in pulpits. But when Edwards went to Yale, he was sufficiently aware that his father and his father's colleagues were lamenting the inexplicable decay of New England piety; when he read Locke, in 1717, and realized that the peripatetic psychology still being taught in Yale and Harvard was hopelessly out of date, and that the new psychology made it indisputable that all ideas originate in sensation, he appears to have been the first in New England to realize that the old indecision was intolerable, that the superstructure of theology would forever rest on shaky foundations if it could not be whole-heartedly committed to the Lockean philosophy. Consequently he dedicated himself with a resolution that otherwise remains incomprehensible to exorcising from New England not only the Aristotelian psychology but also the last vestiges of the Augustinian notion that words serve only to excite an "interior light of truth by virtue of which he himself who is called the interior man is illumined" (Ibid., Par. 40). By demonstrating that words, "being voluntary signs, they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not," Locke prevented Edwards from continuing in the naïve belief of the Puritan founders that words alone could convey to hearers the actual ideas of which they were the signs; but by founding the existence of an idea in the mind upon the shock of sensation, Locke enlisted Edwards against the Augustinian tradition that the sign has meaning because "it finds me knowing the things of which it is the sign" (Ibid., Par. 33). Edwards' problem then became to make words capable not of evoking the idea itself, but of inciting a full awareness of the idea previously given through experience. Without awareness there could be no regeneration.

The regenerate state thus becomes one with that living, pulsating state in which a word is vividly, fully identified with its sensation. As life is lived from day to day, the name imperceptibly takes the place of the sensation, and ultimately becomes the only object for the idea. By then the idea itself becomes a decaying phantasm and only verbal knowledge remains. To our horror we realize that we are lost among signs, none of which any longer have reality. (Thus Edwards accounted for the spiritual languor of New England; thus he saw the Awakening as psychologically justified, and thus he formulated his own "sensational" preaching.) We may note here, incidentally, wherein Edwards basically differed from Berkeley, with whom he is often supposed to offer astonishing parallels: he was untroubled by Berkeley's objection to Locke's abstract ideas; he was ready to take the Lockean psychology to mean pragmatically that whatever may be the object of the mind is its object. The real problem was the subjective state. If the object — be it thing, word, abstract idea, simple idea or "mixed mode" — is vividly realized, the mind is in a healthy relation with truth. But if the only object the mind has in view is a word, a counter for mechanical discourse, a verbal substitute, the mind is diseased and piety is bankrupt.

Hence Edwards works his way from the Lockean theory of language to his distinction between the "understanding of the head" and the "sense of the heart." This is not, as in Coleridge's distinction of Understanding and Reason, a division into separate faculties. In Edwards' "sense of the heart" there is nothing transcendental; it is rather a sensuous apprehension of the total situation. And what makes an idea in the total situation important for man, as the idea taken alone can never be, what makes it in that context something more than an inert impression on passive clay, is man's apprehension that for him it augurs good or evil. It is, in short, something to be saluted by the emotions as well as by the intellect. When a man is threatened, when his life is endangered, the whole man is alerted; the word then becomes one with the thing, becomes in that crisis a signal for positive action. The stupidity of man prevents him, even in matters that concern his physical prosperity, from taking the idea into his inmost being. So the Spirit of God works through the mechanism of the sense impression; commonly it overcomes stupidity at least to the extent of giving an "ideal" view of the object, but when it is truly "efficacious" it gives the full realization of significance, the "actual idea," the meaning of the idea as portending good or evil to the human soul.

The originality of Edwards' argument — the fundamental insight around which his projected system would have swung — was the realiza-

tion that the second stage depends upon and presumes the first, that "saving conviction" presupposes an "ideal apprehension" garnered from sense experience. The supernatural effect thus becomes, in Edwards' vision of the cosmos, integrated "naturally and immediately" into nature. The rational conviction becomes transformed into the spiritual. Out of the mechanism of sensation arises the sense of the heart, and eternal salvation becomes possible in the midst of time.

Thus it can be seen, I believe, that this excerpt, in all its brevity, takes us to the heart of Edwards' metaphysics, and suggests not only his originality but his enduring worth as a religious philosopher. However naïve his psychology may appear today, it has the virtue of holding as its major premise a thorough-going sensationalism, and furthermore is astute enough to perceive that even in mechanism there are refinements beyond the mere reflex. When an idea comes to a living organism charged with the threat of evil or the promise of good, it is apprehended on a level of anxiety. It is then not merely absorbed, like ink into the blotting paper; it is feared or loved. Even though the mind originally receives the idea as an impression from the outside, it is not supine and languid; it has a concern, a stake in the game. Perception becomes a signal, a cue for passion and for action.

It is fascinating, considering how William James went deliberately back to sources which were also Edwards', and how aware he was of the wrong turning the empirical tradition had taken between Edwards' time and his own, to find how nearly James came to restating Edwards' conclusions. Such reasoning as Edwards here exemplifies seems to have informed many of James' observations:

> Consent to the idea's undivided presence, this is effort's sole achievement. Its only function is to get this feeling of consent into the mind. And for this there is but one way. The idea to be consented to must be kept from flickering and going out. It must be held steadily before the mind until it fills the mind. Such filling of the mind by an idea, with its congruous associates, *is* consent to the idea and to the fact which the idea represents.[4]

Edwards' "sense of the heart" was precisely the mind filled with the idea and with all its associates, and then consenting to it. For him, the grace of God was required for full success in the effort, but only on condition that the mind be first willing to consent to whatever it could, of and by itself. It must strive to keep the idea from flickering. If it did, then miraculously and yet logically, consent to the undivided presence flowed "naturally and immediately." Finally, as we know from

[4] The Principles of Psychology, New York, 1890, II, 564.

other passages in Edwards' writings, the supreme and saving consent became feasible — "being's consent to Being."

782. Ideas, Sense of the Heart, Spiritual Knowledge or Conviction. Faith.

[A] great part of our thoughts and the discourse of our minds concerning [things] is without the actual ideas of those things of which we discourse and reason; but the mind makes use of signs instead of the ideas themselves.

A little attentive reflection may be enough to convince anyone of this. Let any man for his own satisfaction take any book and read down one page of it, as fast as he ordinarily is wont to read with understanding. He finishes perhaps the whole page in almost a minute of time; wherein it may be were many such terms as God, man, angel, people, misery, happiness, salvation, destruction, consideration, perplexity, sanctification, and many more such like; and then let him consider whether he has had the actual ideas of all those things, and things signified by every other word in the whole page, in this short space of time; as particularly let him consider whether or no, when in the course of his reading he came upon the word God in such a line, which his mind dwelt not a moment upon, whether or no he had an actual idea of God — i.e., whether he had an actual idea [at] that moment of those things that are principally essential in an idea of God, or whether he had an actual idea of supremacy, of supreme power, of supreme government, of superior knowledge, of will, etc. I apprehend that diligent attention will convince him that he has no natural idea of one of those things when he understandingly reads, or hears, or speaks the word God.

I will instance but in one thing that seems most fundamental of all in the idea of God, viz. understanding or knowledge. He will find that in such cases he had no actual idea at all of this; for if he had an actual idea of understanding or knowledge, then he had an actual idea of ideas, of ideas of perception or consciousness, of judging or perceiving connections and relations between different ideas; and so had an actual idea of various ideas, and [of the] relations between them.

So when he reads the word people, let him enquire whether he had any actual idea of that which was signified by this word. In order to do this he must have an actual idea of man. I do not mean only a confused idea of an outward appearance like that of man, for if that was all, that was not an idea of man properly, but only a sign made use of instead of an idea: but he must have an actual idea of those things, wherein manhood most essentially consists: as an idea of reason, which contains many other actual ideas, as an actual idea of consciousness, an actual idea of a disposal of ideas in the mind, an actual idea of a consequent perception of relation and connections between them, etc. And so he must have an actual idea of will which contains an actual idea of pleasure or pain, agreeableness, or disagreeableness, and a consequent concord of imperate acts of the soul, etc.

So when he reads the word perplexity, let him consider whether he had an actual idea of that actual thing signified by that word, which contained many actual ideas, as an actual idea of thought, and an actual idea of intenseness of thought, an actual idea of [desire], and also earnestness of desire; then an actual idea of disappointment, or crossness to desire, which contains many other actual ideas, and an actual idea of manifoldness of troubles and crosses, etc.

So when he reads the word sanctification, the actual idea of which contains a great many actual ideas, viz. an actual idea of what is implied in the faculties of an intelligent voluntary being, and then an actual idea of holiness, which contains a great number of other actual ideas.

But I need not insist on more instances, I should think that those might be enough to convince anyone that there is very often no actual idea of those things when we are said to think of them; and that the thought is not employed about things themselves immediately, or immediately exercised in the idea itself, but only some sign that the mind habitually substitutes in the room of the idea.

Our thoughts are oftentimes ten times swifter than our reading or speech. Men oftentimes think that in a few minutes, which it would take them a long time to speak. And if there be no room to suppose that all the ideas signified by the words of a discourse

can be actually excited in the mind in reading or speaking, much less can it be in such swift discourse of thought.

We thus in the discourse of our minds generally make use of signs instead of ideas; especially with respect to two kinds of subjects of our thoughts: viz.

1. With respect to general things, or kinds and sorts; such are kinds of substances, and such also are what Mr. Locke calls mixed modes. When we in the course of our thoughts, in reading or hearing, or speaking, or meditation, think of any sort of substances or distinct beings, as particularly of men; instead of going about with attention of mind actually to excite the ideas of those things that belong to the nature of man, that are essential to it, and that distinguish it from other creatures, and so having actually such an abstract idea as Mr. Locke speaks of, we have only an idea of something in our mind, either a name, or some external sensible idea, that we use as a sign to represent that idea. So when, in the discourse of our minds, there passes a thought of that sort of creatures called lions; or that sort of natural bodies called metals; or that called trees. So in mixed modes, such as confusion; decency; harmony; and the like.

2. It is commonly so in our discourses of those things that we can know only by reflection, which are of a spiritual nature, or things that consist in the ideas, acts, and exercises of minds. It has been shown elsewhere that there is no actual idea of those things but what consists in the actual existence of the same things or like things in our own minds. As for instance, to excite the idea of an idea, we must renew that very idea in our minds: we must have the same idea. To have an actual idea of a thought is to have that thought we have an idea of then in our minds. To have an actual idea of any pleasure or delight, there must be excited a degree of that delight. So to have an actual idea of any trouble or kind of pain, there must be excited a degree of that pain or trouble. And to have an idea of any affection of the mind, there must be, then present, a degree of that affection. This alone is sufficient to show that in great part of our discourses and reasonings on things we are without the actual idea of those things of which we discourse and reason; for most of our discourses and reasonings are about things that belong to minds, or things that

we know by reflection, or at least do involve some relation to them in some respect or other. But how far are we, when we speak, or read, or hear, or think of those beings that have minds, or intelligent beings, or of their faculties, and powers, or their dispositions, principles, and acts, and those mixed modes that involve relations to those things, from actually having present in our minds those mental things, those thoughts and those mental acts, that those spiritual things do consist [of], or are related to? Very commonly we discourse about them in our minds, and argue, and reason concerning them, without any idea at all of the things themselves in any degree, but only make use of the signs instead of the ideas; as for instance, how often do we think and speak of the pleasure and delight, or pain and trouble that such have, or have had in such and such things, or things that do in some respect involve pleasure or pain, in their idea, without the presence of any degree of that pleasure, or that trouble, or any real idea of those troublesome, or pleasing sensations?

Those signs that we are wont to make use of in our thoughts for representations of things, and to substitute in the room of the actual ideas themselves, are either the ideas of the names by which we are wont to call them, or the ideas of some external sensible thing that some way belongs to the thing, some sensible image, or resemblance, or some sensible part, or some sensible effect or sensible concomitant, or a few sensible circumstances. We have the ideas of some of those excited, which we substitute in the room of those things that are most essential and use them as signs, as we do words, and have respect to them no further in our discourse.

Hence we do not stand at all on the clearness and distinctness of that external idea, that we thus make use of, but commonly it is very dim and transient, and exceedingly confused, and indistinct. As when, in a course of meditations, we think of men, angels, nations, conversion, conviction; if we have any thing further in our thoughts to represent those things, than only the words, we commonly have only some very confused passing notion of something external, some [notion] which we do not at all insist on the clearness and distinctness of, nor do we find any need of it, because we make use of that external idea no otherwise than as

a sign of the idea, or something to stand in its stead. And the notion need not be distinct in order to do that, because we may habitually understand the use of it as a sign without it. Whereas it would be of great consequence that it should be clear and distinct, if we regarded it as an actual idea, and proper representation of the thing itself.

The signs, that those that have the use of speech do principally make use of in their thoughts, are words, or names; which are indeed very frequently accompanied with some slight confused glance of some sensible idea, that belongs to the thing named; but the name is the principal sign the mind makes use of. Others that are deaf and dumb, do probably make use of the ideas of those signs by which they have been accustomed to signify the thing; or (if we may judge, by what we find in things that we have no names for, as there are many such) they make use of some sensible effect, part, concomitant, or circumstance, as the sign.

It is something external or sensible that we are wont to make use of for signs of the ideas of the things themselves; for they are much more ready at hand, and more easily excited, than ideas of spiritual or mental things, which for the most part cannot be without attentive reflection; and very often the force of the mind is not sufficient to excite them at all, because we are not able to excite in our minds those acts, exercises, or passions, of the mind, that we think of.

We are under a necessity of thus putting signs in our minds instead of the actual ideas of the things signified on several accounts: partly by reason of the difficulty of exciting the actual ideas of things, especially in things that are not external and sensible, which are a kind of things that we are mainly concerned with; and also because, if we must have the actual ideas of everything that comes in our way in the course of our thoughts, this would render our thoughts so slow as to render our powers of thinking in a great measure useless, as may be seen in the instance mentioned of a man reading down a page. Now, when we use signs, instead of the actual ideas themselves, we can sufficiently understand what is contained in that page in a minute of time, and can express the same thoughts to another in a little time by

our voices, and can think ten times as swiftly as we can read or speak; but if, in order to our understanding of what was contained in that page, we must have an actual idea of everything signified by every word in that page, it would take us up many hours to go through with it; for taking in all the ideas that are either directly signified, or involved in relations that are signified by them, it would take us up a considerable time before we could be said to understand one word. But if our understandings were so slow, it would frustrate all use of reading or writing, and all use of speech, yea, and all improvement of a faculty of thinking too. And if all our thoughts must have proceeded after this slow manner from our infancy, we must have remained infants all the days of our lives, and seventy years would have been sufficient to have proceeded but a few steps in knowledge.

This way of thinking by signs, unless as it is abused to an indulgence of a slothful inattentive disposition, well serves as to many of the common purposes of thinking; for in many respects we, without the actual presence of the idea, know how to use the sign as if it were the idea itself. Having learned by frequent experience our minds on the presence of the sign being habitually led to the relations and connections with other things, the presence of the sign in the main does by custom as naturally and spontaneously suggest many relations of the thing signified to others as the hearing of such a certain sound, or seeing such letters, does by custom and habit spontaneously excite such a thought. But if we are at a loss concerning a connection or consequence, or have a new inference to draw, or would see the force of some new argument, then commonly we are put to the trouble of exciting the actual idea, and making it as lively and clear as we can; and in this consists very much of that which we call attention of the mind in thinking. And the force or strength of a mind consists very much in an ability to excite actual ideas, so as to have them lively and clear; and in its comprehension, whereby it is able to excite several at once, to that degree as to see their connection and relations.

Here by the way, we may observe the exceeding imperfection of the HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, and one thing wherein it appears immensely BELOW GOD'S UNDERSTANDING. In that he understands himself and all other things by the actual and immediate

presence of an idea of the things understood. All his understanding is not only by actual ideas of things, without ever being put to it to make use of signs instead of ideas, either through an inability or difficulty of exciting those ideas, or to avoid a slow progress of thought, that would arise by so manifold and exact an attention; but he has the actual ideas of things perfectly in his mind, without the least defect of any part, and with perfect clearness, and without the imperfection of that fleetingness, or transitoriness, that attends our ideas, and without any troublesome exertion of the mind to hold the idea there, and without the trouble we are at to have in view a number at once, that we may see the relations; but has the ideas of all things at once in his mind, and all in the highest possible perfection of clearness, and all permanently, and invariably there without any transitoriness or fading in any part. Our understandings are not only subject to the imperfection, that consists in those things which necessitates us to make use of such signs as we have been speaking of, but this is a source of innumerable errors that we are subject to. Though, as was said before, such a use of signs serves as well to many purposes, yet the want of the actual ideas, and making use only of the signs instead of them, causes mankind to run into a multitude of errors, the falsity of which would be manifest to them, if the ideas themselves were present.

From what has been said, we see that there are two ways of thinking and understanding, especially of spiritual or mental things, that we receive a notion of by reflection or consciousness, viz.

1. That wherein we do not directly view the things themselves by the actual presence of their ideas, or (which is the same thing in mental matters) sensation of their resemblances, but apprehend them only indirectly in their signs, which is a kind of mental reading; wherein we do not look on the things themselves, but only on those signs of them that are before our eyes. This is a mere cogitation without any proper apprehension of the things thought of.

2. There is that which is more properly called apprehension, wherein the mind has a direct ideal view, or contemplation of the thing thought of.

This ideal apprehension or view of mental things is either:

1. Of things that pertain merely to the faculty of understanding, or what is figuratively called the head; including all the modes of mere discerning, judging, or speculation; or

2. Of things that appertain to the other faculty of the will, or what is figuratively called the heart; whereby things are pleasing or displeasing, including all agreeableness and disagreeableness, all beauty and deformity, all pleasure and pain, and all those sensations, exercises and passions of the mind that arise from either of those. An ideal apprehension or view of things of this latter sort is what is vulgarly called having a SENSE. It is commonly said when a person has an ideal view of anything of this nature, that he has a sense of it in his mind, and it is very properly so expressed. For, by what has been said already, persons cannot have actual ideas of mental things without having those very things in the mind; and seeing all of this latter sort of mental things, that belong to the faculty of will or the heart, do, in great part at least, consist in a sensation of agreeableness or disagreeableness, or a sense or feeling of the heart, of pleasedness or displeasedness; therefore it will follow that everyone who has an ideal view of those things has therein some measure of that inward feeling or sense.

Hence arises another great distinction of the kind of understanding of mental things, or those things that appertain or relate to spiritual beings, which is somewhat diverse from the former, viz. of speculative and sensible, or

1. That understanding which consists in mere SPECULATION, or the understanding of the Head; or

2. That which consists in the SENSE OF THE HEART.

The former includes all that understanding that is without any proper ideal apprehension or view, or all understanding of mental things of either faculty, that is only by signs, and also all ideal views of things that are merely intellectual, or appertain only to the faculty of understanding; i.e. all that understanding of things, that does not consist in, or imply, some motion of the will, or in other words (to speak figuratively) some feeling of the heart, is mere speculative knowledge, whether it be an ideal apprehension of them, or no.

But all that understanding of things, that does consist in, or involve, such a sense or feeling, is not merely speculative, but sensible knowledge. So is all ideal apprehension of beauty and deformity, or loveliness and hatefulness, and all ideas of delight or comfort, and pleasure of body or mind, and pain, trouble, or misery, and all ideal apprehension of desires and longings, esteem, acquiescence, hope, fear, contempt, choosing, refusing, accepting, rejecting, loving, hating, anger, and the idea of all the affections of the mind, and all their motions and exercises, and all ideal views of dignity, or excellency of any kind, and also all ideas of terrible greatness, or awful majesty, meanness or contemptibleness, value and importance. All knowledge of this sort, as it is of things that concern the heart, or the will and affections, so it all relates to the good or evil which the sensible idea of things of this nature involves. All knowledge of this sort, as it is of things that concern the heart, or the will and affections, so it all relates to the good or evil that the sensible knowledge of things this nature involves; and nothing is called a sensible knowledge upon any other account but the sense, or kind of inward tasting or feeling, of sweetness or pleasure, bitterness or pain, that is implied in it, or arises from it. Yet it is not only the mere ideal apprehension of that good or evil that is included in what is called being sensible; but also the ideal apprehensions of other things that appertain to the thing known, on which the goodness or evil that attends them depends. As for instance, some men are said to have a sense of the dreadfulness of God's displeasure. This apprehension of God's displeasure is called having a sense, and is to be looked upon as a part of sensible knowledge, because of the evil or pain in the object of God's displeasure, that is connected with that displeasure. But yet in a sense of the terribleness of God's displeasure there is implied an ideal apprehension of more things than merely of that pain or misery or sense of God's heart: there is implied an ideal apprehension of the being of God, as of some intellectual existence, and an ideal apprehension of his greatness and of the greatness of his power.

An ideal apprehension or view of these things is in vulgar speech called having a sense of them; and in proportion to the intensive degree of this ideal apprehension, or the clearness and liveliness

of the idea of them, so persons are said to have a greater or less sense of them; and according to the easiness or difficulty of persons receiving such a sense of things, especially things that it much concerns them to be sensible of, are they called either sensible or stupid.

This distribution of human knowledge into speculative and sensible, though it seem to pertain to one particular kind of the objects of our knowledge, viz., those things that appertain, or relate to the will and affections; yet indeed may be extended to all the knowledge we have of all objects whatsoever. For there is no kind of thing that we know, but what may be considered as in some respect or other concerning the wills or hearts of spiritual beings. And indeed we are concerned to know nothing on any other account; so that perhaps this distribution of the kinds of our knowledge into speculative and sensible, if duly weighed, will be found the most important of all. The distribution is with respect to those properties of our knowledge that immediately relate to our wills and affections, and that in the objects of our knowledge on the account of which alone they are worthy to be known, viz., their relation to our wills and affections, and interest, as good or evil, important or otherwise, and the respect they bear to our happiness or misery.

The will, in all its determinations whatsoever, is governed by its thoughts and apprehensions of things with regard to those properties of the objects of its thoughts, wherein the degree of the sense of the heart has a main influence.

There is a two-fold division or distribution which may be made of the kinds of sensible knowledge of things that men have.

The first respects the ways we come by it.

1. There is that which is purely natural; either such as men's minds come to be impressed with, by the objects that are about them, by the laws of nature; as when they behold anything that is beautiful or deformed, by a beauty or deformity that men by nature are sensible of, then they have sensible knowledge of this beauty or deformity. As when the ear hears a variety of sounds harmoniously proportioned, the soul has a sensible knowledge of the excellency of the sound; so when it tastes any good or ill savour, it has a sensible knowledge of the excellency or hateful-

ness of that savour. So it may have a sensible knowledge of many things by memory and reflection. So a man may have a sensible apprehension of pleasure, or sorrow, that others are the subjects of, indirectly by reflection; either by exciting from the memory something that he has felt heretofore, which he supposes is like it, or by placing himself in others' circumstances, or by placing things about him in his imagination, and from ideas so put together in his mind, exciting something of a like pleasure or pain transiently in himself. Of if those ideas come so together into the mind by the senses, or by the relation of others, such a sensation will spontaneously arise in the mind. In like manner, men may have a sense of their own happiness or misery conceived as future. So men may, by mere nature, come to have a sense of the importance, or terribleness, or desirableness of many things.

2. That sense of things which we do not receive without some immediate influence of the Spirit impressing a sense of things that do concern our greatest interest on our minds. It is found very often a very difficult thing to excite a sense of temporal things in the mind, requiring great attention, and close application of thought, and many times it is not in our power. And in many instances wherein we have a sense of temporal things, that is purely natural, it depends not merely on the force of our thoughts, but on the circumstances we are in, or some special accidental situation and concurrence of things in the course of our thoughts and meditations, or some particular incident in providence that excites a sense of things, or gives an ideal view of them in a way inexplicable. But the exciting sense of things pertaining to our external interest is a thing that we are so far from, and so unable to attain of ourselves, by reason of the alienation of the inclinations and natural dispositions of the soul from those things as they are; and the sinking of our intellectual power, and the great subjection of the soul in its fallen state to the external senses that a due sense of those things is never attained without immediate divine assistance.

It is in this, that the Ordinary Work of the Spirit of God in the hearts of men Consists, viz. in giving a sense of spiritual and eternal things, or of things that appertain to the business of religion and our external interest. The extraordinary influence

of the Spirit of God in inspiration, imparts speculative knowledge to the soul; but the ordinary influence of God's Spirit communicates only a sensible knowledge of those things that the mind had a speculative knowledge of before. And an imagination that some have of speculative knowledge received from the Spirit of God, in those that have no real inspiration, is that wherein ENTHUSIASM consists.

Secondly, The other distribution that may be made of the kinds of sensible knowledge is according to the different nature of the objects of it, into a sense of things with respect to the natural good or evil that is in them, or that they relate to; and a sense of them with respect to Spiritual good or evil. By spiritual good, I mean all true moral good, all real moral beauty and excellency, and all those acts of the will, or that sense of the heart that relates to it, and the idea of which involves it; as all relish for it and desires of it, and delight in it, and happiness consisting in it, etc.

By natural good and evil I mean all that good or evil which is agreeable or disagreeable to human nature as such, without regard to the moral disposition; as all natural beauty and deformity, such as a visible sensible proportion or disproportion in figures, sounds, and beauty of colors; any good or evil that is the object of the external senses; and all that good or evil which arises from gratifying or crossing any of the natural appetites; all that good and evil which consists in gratifying or crossing a principle of self-love, consisting in others' esteem of us, and love to us, or their hatred and contempt; and that desirableness or undesirableness of moral dispositions and actions, so far as arising from hence, and all that importance, worth or terribleness arising from a relation to this natural good or evil.

Persons are capable of some sensible knowledge of things of religion of the former sort, viz. with respect to the natural good or evil that attends them, of themselves, with the same improvement of their natural powers by which they acquire this sensible knowledge of temporal things; because this good and evil consists in an agreeableness, or disagreeableness to human nature as such, and therefore no principles are required in man beyond those that are contained in human nature to discern them, but yet by reason of the natural stupidity of the soul with respect to

things, so diverse from all objects of sense, and so opposite to the natural dispositon of the heart, it is found by experience that men never will obtain any very considerable sense of them without the influence of the Spirit of God assisting the faculties of human nature, and impressing a lively sense of them. But as to the other, viz. a sense of divine things with respect to spiritual good and evil, because these do not consist in any agreeableness, or disagreeableness to human nature as such, or the mere human faculties, or principles; therefore men merely with the exercise of those faculties, and their own natural strength, can do nothing towards getting such a sense of divine things, but it must be wholly and entirely a work of the Spirit of God, not merely as assisting and coworking with natural principles, but as infusing something above nature.

By the things that have been said we may see the difference between the influences of the Spirit of God on the minds of natural men in AWAKENINGS, common CONVICTIONS, and ILLUMINATIONS, and his spiritual influences on the hearts of the saints at and after their conversion.

1. Natural men while they are senseless and unawakened, have very little sensible knowledge of the things of religion, even with respect to the natural good and evil that is in them and attends them; and indeed have very little of an ideal apprehension of any sort of divine and external things, by reason of their being left to the stupifying influence of sin and the objects of sense; but when they are awakened and convinced, the Spirit of God, by assisting their natural powers, gives them an ideal apprehension of the things of religion, with respect to what is natural in them, i.e. of that which is speculative in them, and that which pertains to a sensibleness of their natural good and evil, or all except that which involves a sense of their spiritual excellency. The Spirit of God assists them to an ideal view of God's natural perfections, wherein consists his greatness, and gives a view of this as manifested in his works that he has done, and in the words that he has spoken. And so he gives a sensible apprehension of the heinousness of sin, and his wrath against it, and the guilt of it, and the terribleness of the sufferings denounced against it; and so they have a sense of the importance of the things of religion

in general. And herein consists what we commonly call conviction, and in a sense of the natural good that attends the things of religion, viz. the favor of so great a Being, his mercy as it relates to our natural good, or deliverance from natural evil, the glory of heaven with respect to the natural good that is to be enjoyed there, and the like. And herein consists those affecting, joyful common illuminations, that natural men sometimes have. In thus assisting men's faculties to an ideal apprehension of the natural things of religion, together with what assistance God may give men's natural reason and judgment to see the force of natural arguments, consists the whole of the common work of the Spirit of God in men. And it consists only in assisting natural principles without infusing anything supernatural.

2. The special work of the Spirit of God, or that which is peculiar to the Saints, consists in giving the sensible knowledge of the things of religion with respect to their spiritual good or evil; which indeed does all originally consist in a sense of the spiritual excellency, beauty, or sweetness, of divine things, which is not by assisting natural principles, but by infusing something supernatural.

The ideal apprehension and sensible knowledge of the things of religion will give that conviction of their truth or reality, which can not otherwise be obtained, and is the principal source of that Conviction of the Truth of the things of religion that is given by the immediate influence of the Spirit of God on men's hearts.

1. An ideal apprehension and sensible knowledge of the things of religion, with respect to what is natural in them, such as natural men have that are under awakenings, will give some degree of conviction of the truth of divine things further than a mere notion of them in their signs, or only a speculative apprehension of them; because by this means men are enabled to see in many instances the agreement of the declarations and threatenings of the word of God with the nature of things; which, without an ideal and sensible knowledge of them, they could not have. As for instance, they that from the tokens of God's greatness, his power and awful majesty, in his works, and in his word, have an idea or sense of that greatness, power and awful majesty, and so see the agreement between such works and such words, and such power and

majesty; and therefore hence have a conviction of that truth which otherwise they could not have, viz. that it is a very great Being that made these things, and spake these things; and so from a sense they may hence have of the dreadfulness of the wrath of such a Being, they have a conviction of the truth of what the Scripture teaches about the dreadfulness of God's wrath, and of the punishment of hell. And from the sense they hereby have of the heinousness or dreadfulness of sin against such a God and the natural agreement between affronts of such a majesty and the suffering of extreme misery, it appears much more credible to them that there is indeed an extreme misery to be suffered for sin. And so a sense of the natural good that there is in the things of religion, such as is given in common illuminations makes what the scriptures declare of the blessedness of heaven, etc., to appear to them more credible.

2. An ideal and sensible apprehension of the spiritual excellency of divine things is the proper source of all SPIRITUAL CONVICTION of the truth of divine things, or that belief of their truth that there is in SAVING FAITH. There can be no saving conviction without it, and it is the great thing that mainly distinguishes saving belief, or conviction from all other; or the thing wherein its distinguishing essence does properly lie, that it has a sense of the divine or spiritual excellency of the things of religion, as that which it arises from.

All saving conviction of divine truth does most essentially arise from the spiritual sense of the excellency of divine things; yet this sense of spiritual excellency is not the only kind of ideal apprehension or sense of divine things that is concerned in such a conviction, but it also partly depends on a sensible knowledge of what is natural in religion; as this may be needful to prepare the mind for a sense of its spiritual excellency; and as such a sense of its spiritual excellency may depend upon it. For as the spirtual excellency of the things of religion itself does depend on and presuppose those things that are natural in religion, they being as it were the substratum of this spiritual excellency; so a sense, or ideal apprehension of the one depends in some measure on the ideal apprehension of the other. Thus a sense of the excellency of God's mercy in forgiving sin depends on a sense of the

great guilt of sin, the great punishment it deserves; a sense of the beauty and wonderfulness of divine grace does in great measure depend on a sense of the greatness and majesty of that being whose grace it is, and so indeed a sense of the glory of God's holiness and all his moral perfections and a sense of the excellency of Christ's salvation depends on a sense of the misery and great guilt of those who are the subjects of this salvation; and so, though a saving conviction of the truth of the things of religion does most directly and immediately depend on a sense of their spiritual excellency, yet it also in some measure and more indirectly and remotely depends on an ideal apprehension of what is natural in religion and in a common conviction.

Common conviction, or an ideal and sensible apprehension of what is natural in the things of religion, contributes to a saving conviction of the truth of the gospel especially in this way: men, by being made sensible of the great guilt of sin, or the connection or natural agreeableness there is between that and a dreadful punishment, and how that the greatness and majesty of God seems to require and demand such a punishment, are brought to see the great need of a satisfaction, or something to intervene to make it honorable to that majesty to show them favor; and being for a while blind to the suitableness of Christ's satisfaction in order to this, and then afterwards have a sense given them of Christ's divine excellency, and so the glorious dignity of his person, and what he did and suffered for sinners; hereby their eyes are as it were opened to see the perfect fitness there is in this to satisfy for sin, or to render their being received into favor consistent with the honor of God's offended majesty. The sight of this excellent congruity does very powerfully convince [them] of the truth of the gospel or that his way of satisfying for sin, which now they see to be so congruous, is certainly a real way, not a mere figment, but a divine contrivance, and that there is indeed acceptance to be had with God in this way; and so the soul savingly believes in Christ. The sight of this congruity convinces the more strongly, when at last it is seen, because the person was often told of it before, yet could see nothing of it; which convinces him that it was beyond the invention of men to discover it; for by experience they found themselves all their lifetime wholly blind to it;

but now they see the perfect suitableness there is, which convinces them of the divine wisdom, totally beyond the wisdom of men, that contrived it.

The truth that the soul is most immediately convinced of, in this case, by a sense of the divine excellency of Christ, with a preparatory sense of the need of satisfaction for sin, is not that the Gospel is the Word of God; but this is the truth which the mind first and most directly feels under a conviction of, viz., that the way of salvation which the gospel reveals is a proper, suitable and sufficient way, perfectly agreeable to reason and the nature of things, and that which tends to answer the ends proposed. And the mind being convinced of this truth, which is the great subject of the gospel, it thence naturally and immediately infers from this fitness and sufficiency of this salvation, which the mind has experienced to be so much beyond the power of human reason of itself to discern, that it is certainly a contrivance of a superhuman, excellent wisdom, holiness and justice; and therefore God's contrivance.

THE CONSECRATION OF FAUSTINA THE ELDER AND HER DAUGHTER

That there is something strange and unusual about the 'consecration' coinage of Faustina the Elder, and, to a less degree, of her daughter too, has always been apparent to the student: it was forced on my own attention while I was writing the Introduction to B. M. C. Empire, IV. If I return to the subject, it is because it seems that there is still something to be added to the results already obtained.

It will be well to begin by summing what is already known. Faustina the Elder died early in A. D. 141. She was consecrated in due form, a priesthood was assigned to her worship, a temple and altar were dedicated to her, her image was carried in the 'pompa circensis,' a foundation for orphan girls was established in her honor. Some of these honors were normally conferred on the new 'divus' or 'diva' — only, here, we are struck at once by a certain profusion. The sequel is more remarkable. Coins in the name of 'Diva Faustina' continued to be issued in great mass, apparently through the whole course of the reign of Antoninus Pius. Apart from the more regular types — altar, temple, pyre, peacock — there are reverses of special goddesses, such as Juno, Ceres and Vesta, a special dedication of the temple, honors voted 'ex s. c.,' and so on. Above all, there are two series of great length and similar character, probably successive in order of time. In that which is probably the earlier, the one reverse legend, AETERNITAS, is illustrated by a series of divine persons or personifications, bearing attributes familiar for goddesses or virtues, but in hardly a single case exactly coinciding with any of the familiar main types. There are also such types as altar, temple, star. The AVGVSTA series is of similar composition — only that AVGVSTA, 'revered lady,' now takes the place of AETERNITAS as the key-note of the reverses. These two series have been closely discussed by Paul L. Strack[1] and myself. Strack regards the female figures as so many distinct expressions of the one divine conception, Aeternitas. What I have said amounts to almost exactly the same thing, but, as I contend, it is more correctly formulated in terms of Roman religious belief and Roman practice in consecration. Faustina is represented, under the guise of goddesses and virtues, in her new home in the eternal sphere. My explanation has the great advantage

[1] Paul L. Strack, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der röm. Kais. Münzprägung.

that it allows one and the same rule to be applied to both series, AETERNITAS and AVGVSTA. In both, the theme is AVGVSTA IN AETERNITATE, 'the revered lady in eternity'; but, in the earlier issue, the stress falls on eternity, in the second on the revered lady. We may conjecture plausibly, though without absolute certainty, that the AVGVSTA issue belongs to the years after A. D. 147, when there was a new 'Augusta,' Faustina the Younger, reigning on earth, and it seemed fitting to direct attention also to the 'Augusta' reigning on high.

It was always known that the coins of Diva Faustina were far commoner than consecration issues are wont to be. A recent examination of a great hoard from Valeni in Rumania [2] has shown how very common they can be. To 502 coins of Antoninus, there were 563 of Faustina the Elder, 539 of her as 'Diva'. This hoard may not be quite typical. The huge hoard of Réka Dévnia [3] showed 4158 of Faustina (of which almost exactly 4000 were posthumous) beside 7734 of Antoninus. We should need to analyse a number of large hoards, in order to determine what the exact normal proportions of these two coinages are. But it is obvious already that the coinage of Diva Faustina formed a substantial part of the money in circulation both under the reign of Antoninus and even after his death.

The 'consecration' coinage of the younger Faustina may be more summarily treated. Faustina died at Halala in Cappadocia in A. D. 175, after loyally sharing with her husband the hardships and dangers of his campaigns. She too was honored with a 'consecration' coinage which passed through several stages and must, therefore, have covered no short period, perhaps even the rest of the reign of Marcus. It is distinguished less by its great variety and extent than by many features of interest and beauty, — the honor paid to Faustina as 'mater castrorum,' the assumption into Heaven, SIDERIBVS RECEPTA, Diva Faustina throned with the Hours and so on. Compared to the consecration coins of her mother, her own issues are not so very common. In Valeni there were 18 consecration coins out of a total for Faustina of 313 against 354 of Marcus. In Reka Dévnia, there were 488 out of a total of 3504 for Faustina against 7716 for Marcus.

It is time to ask what is new in the honors paid to these 'revered ladies,' how that new element fits into the history of the institution of consecration, and what light it throws on the personal character of the two Emperors, concerned, Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius.

Both Faustina the Elder and her daughter have been the targets of

[2] Valeni Hoard, description in the British Museum.
[3] Le Trésor numismatique de Réka-Dévnia. N. A. Mouchmoff 1934.

some very venomous gossip. In the case of the daughter, who spent a large part of her life in bearing sons and daughters to her philosopher husband, the accusation comes near to being absurd. Both Antoninus and Marcus never gave any sign that they had any reason for vexation or disquiet in the conduct of their wives and heaped honors on them, living and dead. It is surely safe to judge with Pius and Marcus against the muddy gossips of Rome. But such rumors, even if quite untrue, do mean something. Good emperors were not universally popular. There were classes that preferred their emperors bad; life offered more fun and more opportunity under them. It was easier to assail the good through their wives than in their own persons, and, if both emperors were uxorious and disposed to push honors beyond ordinary norms, the gossips may have been reacting in what seemed to them justifiable exasperation.

There was nothing new in the consecration of women. That an empress who had died in the odor of sanctity should receive divine honors was now taken almost as a matter of course. Consecration of women in the Early Empire had been somewhat sparingly — and sometimes ludicrously — applied. Tacitus (Germania, ch. 8), while accepting the consecration of men as a necessity of State, still permits himself a sneer at the consecration of women. But Trajan had consecrated his sister, Marciana, Hadrian had consecrated Plotina, wife of Trajan, Matidia, niece of his wife, Sabina, and finally, Sabina herself. The consecration of Faustina, then, at her premature death in A. D. 141 was inevitable.

And yet there was something new in what followed — in the devotion of the Emperor to the elaboration of the idea and in his persistence in that devotion. Normally, with a new 'diva', there was a grand inaugural ceremony to launch the new cult, followed by its disappearance or at least its sinking into the background of the religious life of Rome. But Antoninus would not allow the worship of Faustina so to sink. After giving her all the customary honors, he continued, with the senate, to devise new ones for her. The coins — and, no doubt, they represent for us many major works of art — kept her memory alive in the hearts of the Roman people. She was to be as real — more real, perhaps — than Juno, Ceres or Vesta. At Ostia, we happen to know that it was made obligatory on all young couples marrying in that colony, to perform an act of worship to those eminent representatives of Concord, Antoninus and Diva Faustina.[4] This may have been

[4] C. I. L. XIV. 5326: 'Decurionum decreto imp. Caesari T. Aelio Hadriano Antonino Pio p(atri) p(atriae) et divae Faustinae ob insignem eorum concordiam

only one of a number of ceremonies, in which her memory was kept green. It would not be surprising if some gentlemen, without strong religious sense, wearied of the whole story and, in their own fashion, cried 'Hold, enough!'

Antoninus Pius has only left us the coins to record his personal emotions; but he had a predecessor in Rome, who on a similar occasion of grief poured out his heart to his friends and to us. When Cicero lost his darling daughter, Tullia, he was inconsolable, and, when at last he did begin to admit some comfort, it took the form of paying extraordinary honor to her memory. Tullia was to be worshipped not as an unhappy ghost, but in a temple, as a divine being.[5] What Cicero, the orator, could not accomplish, Antoninus, the Emperor, could and did. He seems to have loved his wife and mourned her sincerely. He had the power to bestow a formal immortality by the rite of Consecration. But he had also the power to make it something more than formal by insisting on her reality of power and continuing existence. I think that we must allow that Antoninus himself believed that his wife was still a living and powerful personality; he certainly meant the Roman citizen to believe it. Marcus seems to have acted for the daughter as Antoninus had done for the mother. We know enough of the sad Stoic creed of Marcus to be sure that individual immortality had little real meaning for him, but he too insured for his beloved wife a place in the official heaven, a place in the official religion of the State: he may even have taken advantage of one of the loopholes, left in the strict Stoic belief, and have postulated some kind of survival — even if not strictly eternal — for herself.

This development of consecration, seen in the case of the two Faustinas, is peculiar and outside the main line of evolution. It seems to show a tenderer and more personal 'pietas' than one might expect to find in a Roman Emperor; it seems also to imply a breadth and depth of religious interest, above the average. Consecration had several distinct tendencies during the Empire, but, in the main, it was official, orthodox, only mildly emotional — a recognized form of honor for correct official conduct, a test of public loyalty. But, now, for a moment it seemed that the Romans were being invited to worship the 'revered ladies' with something more than formal care, that the imperial cult was being introduced into the realm of personal religion. It was an

utique in ara virgines quae in colonia Ostiensi nubent item mariti earum supplicent.'

[5] Cp. Epistulae ad Atticum XII. 12, Ad Fam. IV. 5. etc.

Reference to B. M. C. Empire, IV, is required at intervals throughout the paper; the passages most in question are Introduction, pp. LVIII ff.lxxxiiiff, CXXXIIff, CXLIVf., and Text, pp. 42ff., 228ff., 487ff., 649ff.

interesting suggestion, but it went no further. The example of Antoninus and Marcus found no followers. When consecration again, under Trajan Decius, emerged from its usual formalism, it was in a new sense. Not the personal side, but the official was emphasized; the 'divi' were held up to the world as the guarantors of the Roman 'virtus.'

What the cult of the two Faustinas *does* illustrate is the importance of the imperial house, the 'domus divina,' in the life of Rome. The good, we know, are liable to ambition — it is the last sin to be put off. Of that not very culpable ambition that consists in seeing your own environment in a slightly exaggerated gleam of glory even as noble a Roman as Antoninus Pius was not quite free. Mild and inoffensive here, as ever, Antoninus did nevertheless take pains that Rome should not forget the authority and importance of his house. When Marcus married Faustina, the princess at once became Augusta, while Marcus continued to hold the lower rank of Caesar; the tribunician power, which he received, was hardly full compensation for this deficiency. Marcus never said a word to criticize his father by adoption; but, on his own accession, when he had to face the problem of how to treat Lucius Verus, he advanced him direct to the rank of Augustus. This is as clear a sign as one could want that he did not take quite the same view of obligations as Antoninus. Yet, when it came to the honoring of his own wife after death, he remembered that her dowry had been the Empire, that she had shared in all his joys and sorrows, and he showed towards her a 'pietas' hardly less than that of Antoninus for the elder Faustina.

This is just one case, in which the quiet reign of Antoninus, if closely examined, betrays features of interest, that tend to escape notice, because their manifestations were not violent. There are probably more such to be found for the looking. They are worth looking for; even if inconspicuous in themselves, they may be related to movements that attained obvious significance in later times.

British Museum HAROLD MATTINGLY

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